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“Citigroup representatives fanned out across San Francisco’s financial district on Oct. 17, handing out 
fliers promoting six-month certificates of deposit with 4 percent interest rates” – Bloomberg, “Citi 
Squeezed in Debt Market as JPMorgan, Wells Lure Deposits” October 20, 2008. 
 “The fact that Washington Mutual is now owned by Chase is very positive, because they were a huge 
outlier on rates," Kenneth D. Lewis, then Chairman and CEO of Bank of America, as cited in American 
Banker, “Deposit-Gathering Pitches Evolving Amid Upheaval”, October 9, 2008. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
    
In financial crises of the recent past, investors often withdrew from securities markets and 
placed their funds into safer assets, such as U.S. Treasuries and bank deposits.  During such episodes, a 
wide range of businesses shut out of securities markets sought to fund their operations by drawing 
down credit lines established with banks during normal times.  Awash with funds from depositors 
seeking a safe haven, banks had no difficulty meeting these increased credit demands (e.g., Gatev and 
Strahan, 2006).  Thus, banks seem to have helped avoid financial disruptions and business liquidations 
that would have occurred in the absence of a liquidity backstop.     
In 2007-09, however, banks were themselves at the center of the financial crisis.  While 
significant risks were present in some other financial institutions, this crisis was special in that 
commercial banks were much more exposed to losses than in recent past crises.  This feature of the 
crisis casts doubt on the notion that banks can be taken for granted as a natural source of liquidity 
during financial crises.  Were banks still viewed as a safe haven, and if not, how compromised was their 
ability to meet the demand for liquidity? And, what actions did banks take to ensure that inflows into 
deposit funds persisted as their funding sources were drying up?  
To answer these questions, we investigate the behavior of bank deposit rates and flows during 
the recent financial crisis.  As banks become weak or liquidity-constrained, they may seek to attract 
deposits by offering higher rates.  For example, Washington Mutual pitched above-market rates prior to 
its acquisition by JP Morgan Chase in 2008 as did Countrywide in 2007.
1  More broadly, competition for 
deposits can be intense during a crisis.  Indeed, there were several news reports of extensive deposit 
promotions despite significant cuts in the Federal funds rate during 2008 (e.g., Citibank introduced a 6-
month CD offering 4% in October 2008 compared with an average rate of 2.9% that it paid on its 
deposits in the third quarter).
2   
                                                            
1 See the American Banker, October 9, 2008, “Deposit-Gathering Pitches Evolving Amid Upheaval” and December 
5, 2007, “Why Rate Cuts Aren’t Helping on the Deposit Side”.   
2 See Bloomberg, October 20, 2008, “Citi Squeezed in Debt Market as JPMorgan, Wells Lure Deposits”.    3 
 
In support of this anecdotal evidence, Chart 1a shows the average rates offered by failed banks 
and nearly failed banks (decline in stock price of 90% or more), as measured by the difference from the 
rates of non-fail banks (that is, banks that did not fail), over a one year period prior to failure, for failures 
occurring during the 1997-2009 period.  For ease of comparison, the x-axis is the time to failure.  By 
failures, we hereafter mean both actual and nearly failed banks (specifically, failure for the latter cases is 
recorded starting the first date when the 18-month return over the period 1997-2009 was worse than    
-90% using daily stock return data and following Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson, 2010).
3  
This cursory graphical analysis shows that these weak institutions offered substantially higher CD rates 
in the run-up to failure.  For example, the differential between their 12-month CD rate and that of non-
fail banks crept up from 10 basis points one year prior to failure to close to 60 basis points in the last 
two weeks before failure (and even their checking rates edged up).  Chart 1b narrows the set to four 
prominent examples of banks and thrifts that failed (IndyMac, Washington Mutual) or nearly failed 
(Wachovia, Citi) in the crisis.  Zooming in on these four large financial institutions, their average 12-
month CD (60-month CD) differential reached 100 basis points (130 basis points).    
Were institutions that later failed able to attract correspondingly greater deposit inflows?  The 
descriptive evidence from the quarterly regulatory reports indicates that these institutions lost deposits 
as they approached failure.  Chart 2 shows that while they were able to initially maintain inflows of 
insured deposits, even insured deposits registered a negative growth rate in the last two quarters prior 
to failure (e.g., average insured deposit growth was roughly -1% in the quarter of the institution’s final 
regulatory filing, and similarly, uninsured deposit growth reached -2%).  A similar pattern characterized 
core deposits that also fell five quarters prior to failure (core deposits exclude large time and foreign 
deposits and are commonly considered stable sources of funding).     
This deposit funding pressure was not limited to banks that failed but was widespread and 
particularly acute in the first phase of the crisis from the ABCP “freeze” starting August 9, 2007 (as 
documented in Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez, 2009), until just before the Lehman failure on September 
15, 2008.  Although core deposits increased in the banking system by close to $800 billion from end 
2007 to early 2009 (Table 1 and He, Khang and Krishnamurthy,2010), core deposits increased by just $90 
billion up until 2008:Q2.  In other words, the sharp increase in core deposits only occurred in 2008:Q3, 
                                                            
3 For example, the near-failure date for Wachovia was September 29, 2008 (coinciding with the date its acquisition 
was announced), and for Citi was November 20, 2008 (the U.S. government provided a package of guarantees, 
liquidity financing and capital on November 23). 4 
 
growing by $272 billion in just one quarter – and occurred across both large and small banks and 
extended to large time deposits as well (Table 1).
4  
The deposit funding squeeze – coupled with the wholesale funding shortage in the ABCP market 
– led banks to seek deposits by offering higher deposit interest rates.  We document that banks offering 
higher rates were those most exposed to liquidity demand shocks (as measured by their unused 
commitments, wholesale funding dependence, and limited liquid assets), as well as with fundamentally 
weak balance-sheets (e.g., as measured by their non-performing loans or by subsequent failure).  At the 
same time, large banks – enjoying implicit guarantees because of their “too-big-to-fail” status – 
benefited from greater deposit inflows despite offering lower deposit rates, all else equal.   
Importantly, we also find support for an industry equilibrium view of deposit rate policies.  That 
is, a bank’s deposit rates are not set in isolation of the behavior of other banks.   Banks offer higher rates 
when others raise their offered rates, in particular when the bank is located in a geographic market 
where a large fraction of deposits belong to banks that are about to fail.  This suggests a negative 
externality or a competitive interest-rate “contagion” from weak banks desperately scrambling for 
deposit funding.  However, we find that the competitive pressure on deposit rates of a bank is relieved 
when the bank’s deposit market is concentrated or when seniors make up a large fraction of its 
population.   
We conclude that it is not necessarily the case that all increases in deposit funds are the 
outcome of banks passively accepting funds as a safe haven.  The role of the banking system as a 
stabilizing liquidity insurer is an active one.  And in some cases, it is not necessarily stabilizing if funds 
are deposited at unhealthy banks with attractive rates or at banks with an unnatural advantage because 
of explicit or implicit guarantees.  We end by reconciling our findings to those of Gatev and Strahan 
(2006) and showing that even in the period before the 2007-09 crisis when banks were relatively 
untouched by market turbulence, there is evidence that banks exposed to liquidity demand shocks 
offered higher rates in order to secure deposit inflows in times of market stress. 
Our description throughout is framed around an active response by liquidity-short banks to 
attract funds by raising deposit rates.  This view and the results are not incompatible with depositors 
also disciplining riskier banks by withdrawing funds and by demanding higher rates (as shown in the 
diagram in Chart 3, panel A and further discussed in Section 6.1 on related literature).  The reason our 
                                                            
4 While banks remained heavily exposed to losses even after 2008:Q3, the jump in aggregate uncertainty following 
the Lehman failure, coupled with a sudden shift in the perceived riskiness of money market funds and enacted 
measures of official support (including raising deposit insurance limits) finally pushed funds into the banking 
system.   5 
 
discussion centers on banks as stressed entities is because this paper is closely related to earlier studies 
depicting banks as passive entities accepting flight-to-safety funds specifically in times of financial crises.  
As a result, our paper directly addresses why banks exposed to liquidity demand shocks, such as banks 
with greater credit lines extended, may not be able to provide liquidity in a bank-centered crisis, 
especially one in which aggregate risk rises.  In contrast, the depositor discipline literature is primarily 
interested in cross-sectional bank risk differences and does not distinguish between crises and non-
crises episodes.       
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 begins with a brief review of the theory 
that banks can provide liquidity when financial markets and other financial institutions cannot―and why 
the theory might break down in a crisis.  Section 3 develops testable hypotheses for individual bank 
behavior when banks need funds to support increased loan demand but face deposit funding pressure, 
and also for the inter-dependence of deposit rates across banks.  Section 4 presents aggregate evidence 
in support of the view that banks experienced increased loan demand but that deposit inflows were 
weak and not commensurate with lending needs, especially in the first year of the crisis.  This narrative, 
therefore, provides support for the underlying environment assumed in the hypothesis development 
section, namely, that deposit funding was tight and banks had an incentive to actively manage deposit 
rates.  Section 5 provides empirical support for the hypotheses laid out in Section 3.  Section 6 relates 
our findings to the existing literature and presents some policy implications.  Section 7 concludes. 
2.  BANKS AS LIQUIDITY PROVIDERS: THE TRADITIONAL VIEW AND ITS RECONSIDERATION  
2.1. The rationale for banks as liquidity providers 
Banks are considered to have an important advantage over other financial institutions in 
providing various forms of liquidity commitments such as corporate lines of credit and demandable 
deposits.  This advantage relates to how they resolve the liquidity management problem that arises 
when commitments are converted into funded loans and immediacy is demanded on deposits.  As 
described by Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002), banks combine deposit-taking with loan commitments.  A 
synergy exists between these two activities to the extent that both services require banks to hold 
balances of liquid assets to provide liquidity on demand to depositors as well as to credit line borrowers.  
In particular, banks have a natural advantage in providing liquidity if deposit withdrawals and 
commitment draw-downs are not correlated.   
Indeed, studies have shown that during past episodes of market stress, deposit withdrawals and 
commitment draw-downs were negatively related (Saidenberg and Strahan, 1999; Gatev and Strahan, 6 
 
2006; Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan, 2009).  For example, when the commercial paper market 
encountered stress, the funds that investors pulled out of this market flowed primarily into the banking 
system.  As a result, deposits flowed into banks just as borrowers resorted to drawing down their bank 
credit lines.  These papers argue that funds flow into bank deposits in times of stress because banks are 
viewed as safe havens due to government guarantees on deposits.
5   The  view that government 
guarantees are responsible for the deposit inflows during crises is supported by evidence that such 
deposit inflows did not occur prior to the FDIC’s inception in 1934.  Pennacchi (2006) showed that during 
times of tight market liquidity from 1920 to 1933, no increases in bank deposits were observed and 
liquidity shocks were accompanied by declines in bank loans and investments.   
2.2. Why there may be limits to banks providing liquidity in a crisis 
We argue, however, that banks may not be able to provide liquidity in every crisis.  A main 
reason for this is that investors may question the safety of bank deposits as well, especially when banks 
are directly exposed to the financial crisis (as illustrated by a depositor run at IndyMac in July 2008).  
Most deposits are over the deposit insurance limit (over 62% in 2007:Q2) and are not explicitly 
guaranteed in the event of a bank failure.  This lack of guarantee can become especially important in a 
bank-centered crisis, when uncertainty about the condition of an individual bank may prompt depositors 
to run from the bank even if it turns out to be ex post fundamentally solvent.
6   
A second reason is that depositors may worry that the government will not provide enough 
resources to make them whole in the event of a bank failure (e.g., there was evidence of risk-pricing of 
insured deposits during the savings and loans crisis in the 1980s when the guarantor of savings and 
loans, the FSLIC, was approaching insolvency (Cook and Spellman, 1994)).  In the recent crisis, 
uncertainty over the safety of insured deposits may have increased as the FDIC’s reserves started to dip.  
By the end of 2008, the FDIC’s ratio of reserves to total insured deposits had fallen to 0.4%, and the 
Treasury did not increase its backup line of credit to the FDIC until March 2009 (see the discussion in 
Acharya, Santos and Yorulmazer, 2010). 
                                                            
5 One point of departure from Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) that Gatev and Strahan (2006) take is on what 
drives deposit flows in times of reduced market liquidity.  The thesis in Kashyap, Rajan and Stein is that the 
coexistence of deposits and lending is due to real benefits and is not the result of historical or contemporary 
regulatory distortions.  That is, they do not think it is an artificial synergy resulting from deposit insurance.  Gatev 
and Strahan reason, instead, that banks experience deposit inflows precisely because they are perceived to be safe 
havens.  They conjecture that this is largely due to government support, both explicit through deposit insurance 
and implicit through expected bailouts.  The two views are not necessarily orthogonal, however. 
6 For example, Iyer and Puri (2008) show that depositors “ran” from a fundamentally sound bank when a nearby 
bank failed and that deposit insurance was only partly successful at limiting outflows of insured deposits. 7 
 
A third reason considered in Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2010) is that aggregate risk may 
rise during a crisis.  When this happens, the ability of banks to diversify or smooth shocks across 
corporations and depositors falls.  In anticipation, banks may raise costs for provision of liquidity 
insurance, e.g., increase spreads on corporate lines of credit.  And, in response to reduced bank liquidity 
(outside of their model), depositors may leave banks, especially those that are heavily exposed to the 
rise in aggregate risk and the underlying economic shock. 
Other factors besides concern over bank safety and ability to provide liquidity may also 
contribute to weak deposit inflows for banks in a crisis.  One such factor in the recent crisis was that 
household wealth took a hit, and households are typically the main source of deposit funds.  U.S. 
households’ net worth fell from $65.8 trillion at the end of 2007:Q2 to $48.8 trillion by 2009:Q1 (from 
falling house values and stock market declines, affecting both real estate assets and financial assets such 
as pension fund assets, mutual fund shares, and directly held corporate equity).
7  Moreover, households 
faced with increased liquidity constraints may have been more likely to withdraw deposits to cover 
consumption needs.  For example, Chakrabarti et al (2011) find that more households reported 
withdrawing funds from deposit accounts than having added funds; the main reasons being a need to 
pay for living expenses and to reduce debt. 
A second important factor was that money market mutual fund accounts (MMMF) were 
competing deposit collectors (Pennacchi, 2006).  Investors saw MMMFs as safe up until the Lehman 
bankruptcy and the ensuing losses and redemption demands on the Reserve Primary Fund and other 
funds in September 2008.  Even though a large share of prime MMMFs had invested in ABCP, these 
funds did not experience losses in 2007 because of credit and liquidity guarantees to ABCP conduits 
from their sponsor banks (Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez, 2009; McCabe, 2010).  This is also confirmed by 
large inflows of funds into MMMFs (exceeding inflows into deposit accounts) in 2007 and early 2008 
(Federal Reserve Bulletin, 2010).     
Finally, banks may also face difficulty in providing liquidity during a bank-centered crisis if 
wholesale funds become more difficult to raise, especially from the private sector.
8  The difficulty of 
raising wholesale funds in a bank-centered crisis has become more relevant over time because 
wholesale funds have become a greater source of funds for the banking system (increasing from roughly 
                                                            
7 These figures are from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds Z.1 Release, Table B.100; see also Shapiro (2010).    
8 Evidence of banks having difficulty getting wholesale funds from the private sector in the 2007-09 financial crisis 
is documented by Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010), and 
Adrian et al (2010). Afonso, Kovner and Schoar (2010) show that while the federal funds market did not entirely 
dry up, it was significantly stressed in the aftermath of the Lehman failure. 8 
 
25% of assets in the early 1990s to 40% in 2007, where wholesale funds are defined as liabilities 
excluding core deposits).   
3.  HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
This section develops testable hypotheses for how a bank facing funding pressure is expected to 
actively seek deposits.  In much of this discussion, banks will be assumed to be short of deposits relative 
to lending and other asset funding needs, theoretical motivation for which was provided in Section 2.2 
and supportive evidence for which during the 2007-2009 crisis will be provided in Section 4.  This section 
also develops hypotheses that link a bank’s deposit rates to that of other banks in the system and to the 
extent of competition in a bank’s geographic market. 
3.1. The Dependence of Rates on Bank Fundamentals 
First, banks most susceptible to funding pressure are those banks that are documented to have 
later failed.  Therefore, in a bank-level regression capturing the relationship shown in Charts 1 and 2, we 
expect that banks lose deposits prior to failure (especially deposits that are not insured), that they react 
by raising deposit rates, and that this relationship gets stronger as the bank gets closer to failing.  
Specifically, the deposit rate offered by bank i at time t is modeled as follows: 
             ,            ,   
 
   
   
                                                                                                        ,        ,  , 
where Fail is a dummy equal to one in the period that the bank fails and 0 otherwise (the time period is 
quarterly when using Call Report data).  Up to L leads of the fail dummy are included.  Other controls 
capture time-varying changes in a bank’s local geographic market conditions such as deposit market 
concentration and district time trends.  Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.  More detail on 
the regressions is provided in Section 5 and the Appendix.  We test 
Hypothesis 1:     0 .     And            . 
Second, if bank deposit funding was tight during the crisis, we expect that banks differed in their 
need for additional funding and that depositors were also discriminating between banks.  While most 
banks did not fail, there was nonetheless considerable variation in a bank’s vulnerability to the risk of 
illiquidity or of insolvency.   Therefore, more liquid banks and banks more likely to be solvent could 
afford to offer lower rates during the crisis (see the illustration in Panel A of Chart 3).    Our proxies for 
liquidity include a low exposure to liquidity demand risk, a buffer of liquid assets, and a low reliance on 
wholesale funding.    Proxies for solvency (or perceived solvency) include low nonperforming loans, 9 
 
robust capital adequacy, and an indicator of “too-big-to-fail” bank size.  The variable crisis represents a 
dummy variable indicating the period of the 2007-2009 financial crisis.  We describe these measures and 
how they are empirically represented at greater length in Section 5.  We estimate the model and test, 
respectively, 
             ,                         ,       
                                                        ,                        
                         ,      
                                                       ,                        
                                                                                                        ,        ,   
Hypothesis 2:     0   ,     0 .  
Third, in practice, deposit rates and deposit quantities are jointly determined.  Weak banks can 
moderate a deposit drain by offering higher rates.  At the same time, exogenous inflows of deposits 
afford banks the opportunity to reduce their rates.
9  Specifically, we estimate and test, respectively 
             ,      ∆         ,                 ,       
                                                                                                        ,        ,   
∆         ,                         ,                 ,       
                                                                                                        ,        ,   
Hypothesis 3:     0   ,     0 .  
  In the absence of instruments, the observed relationship between deposit rates and quantities 
represents the set of equilibria resulting from the intersection of the two curves as shown in Chart 3.  In 
order to trace out the downward sloping curve where greater deposit inflows depress rates, we use 
deposits of nearby failed banks as an instrument for a bank’s deposit growth (this identifies the bank 
supply curve as illustrated in Panel B of Chart 3).  That is, the more that deposits in a bank’s geographic 
market were in deposit accounts at failed banks, the more likely a nearby surviving bank is to receive 
some of these funds.  This variable is constructed using information on failed banks together with 
branch data from the Summary of Deposits (see Appendix).  Anecdotal evidence supports the use of this 
instrument.  For example, North Carolina based BB&T Corp. managed to attract $1.2 billion of deposits 
from Wachovia, also based in North Carolina, during the third quarter of 2008 and expected more 
                                                            
9 The existing literature on depositor discipline looks at each of deposit rates and flows separately (see the 
discussion in Section 6.1), with the exception of Maechler and McDill (2006) whose primary interest was in 
estimating the positive response of deposit quantities to the deposit rate.    10 
 
inflows at the time of the report (Bloomberg, October 20, 2008).  Wachovia was acquired by Wells Fargo 
at the end of that quarter. 
  In order to trace out the upward sloping demand for deposit curve, potential candidates for 
instruments of the deposit rate are the cost of funds from alternative sources.  These sources are the 
wholesale market including the interbank market (as reflected by the LIBOR spread over Treasury, the 
TED spread) and the discount window.  Note that time fixed effects are excluded in this instrumented 
regression because the instrument is time-varying only. 
3.2. The Interdependence of Rates: An Industry Equilibrium View 
Not only is the deposit rate offered by a bank expected to depend on its own fundamentals, but 
it is also expected to depend on the deposit rate policies of other banks in the system.  That is, when 
other banks offer higher rates, that action can push up the rate for bank i, controlling for its 
fundamentals and other market conditions.  Specifically, if     is the deposit rate of bank i and     ,  is the 
average deposit rate of other banks, then we estimate and test, respectively 
            ,          ,                          ,                     ,        
Hypothesis 4:     0 ,             0   if industry effects were heightened in the crisis. 
Anecdotal evidence from the crisis hints at such industry effects. For example, a number of 
regional banks with strong balance-sheets initiated competitive deposit rate campaigns in order to 
“attract customers from other institutions who may not be as sure about their bank” (spokeswoman for 
TD Banknorth Inc., a unit of Toronto-Dominion Bank as cited in American Banker, October 9, 2008).   
Moreover, competitive pressure from the industry is expected to be greater in competitive 
deposit markets.  Specifically, if HHI is the Herfindahl index for a bank’s geographic market (from the 
Summary of Deposits and is branch deposit-weighted), then we estimate and test, respectively 
                                                ,                     ,        
Hypothesis 5a:     0 ,             0   if competitive effects were heightened in the crisis. 
It is also possible to extend this hypothesis one step further: Banks in more competitive markets 
are expected to raise rates when the rates of other banks go up:  
                                            ,          ,                 
                        ,                   ,                           ,                     ,        
Hypothesis 5b:     0 ,             0   if competitive effects were heightened in the crisis. 
Finally, just as less competitive deposit markets are expected to dampen industry effects, so too 
are markets with an ample supply of deposit funds.  One exogenous driver of deposit supply takes the 11 
 
form of a large fraction of seniors (65 and over) making up the local market’s population.  This 
hypothesis builds on Becker (2007) who showed that seniors hold a large share of their wealth in the 
form of bank deposits and this driver of deposit supply is independent of local demand conditions (we 
also control for variables capturing local economic conditions in the regressions).  He also showed that 
deposits instrumented with seniors in the metropolitan area had real effects on the investment of bank-
dependent borrowers.  The fraction of seniors is taken from the 2000 Census data and is matched to 
geographic areas for a bank’s branches in the Summary of Deposits.  Empirically, this hypothesis can be 
represented by a model similar to that for hypothesis 5: 
Hypothesis 6: Coefficients signed as in Hypothesis 5 when substituting the fraction of seniors for 
HHI (and controlling for HHI).  
4.  AGGREGATE EVIDENCE FROM THE 2007-09 FINANCIAL CRISIS  
This section brings together evidence documenting that banks were indeed exposed to the financial 
crisis via credit losses and uncertainty surrounding these losses, which we assumed while developing our 
empirical hypotheses in Section 3.  At the same time, the banking system faced an increased demand for 
liquidity via credit lines drawn by corporate borrowers and ABCP conduits.  However, the banking 
system did not gain proportionate deposits to match its funding needs, especially prior to the Lehman 
failure.  Together, these factors contributed to funding pressure on banks and a motive for them to 
increase the deposit interest rates offered.  
4.1. The Exposure of the Banking System to the Financial Crisis 
First, we note that risks were more concentrated in the banking system than in financial crises of 
the recent past.  The banking system’s profitability fell as the aggregate return on assets dropped from 
1% at an annual rate at the start of 2007 to nearly -1% by the end of 2008.  In contrast, return on assets 
had hovered around 1% during the earlier episodes of financial stress, like the 1998 LTCM crisis (see 
Mora, 2010, for evidence on the banking system’s performance). 
Second, commercial banks were especially affected in this crisis because of their exposure to 
real estate loans and mortgage-related securities, whose values sharply declined.  As noted by Acharya 
and Richardson (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), and Diamond and Rajan (2009), among others, a 
significant portion of new financial instruments found their way on to commercial and investment bank 
balance sheets.  As a result, commercial banks’ holdings of real estate loans and mortgage-backed 
securities accounted for about 40% of the total amount of such loans and securities outstanding in 2007 
(Mora, 2010).  Not only were banks directly holding mortgage-related securities but they had also 
offered liquidity and credit support to issuers of debt backed by mortgage securities.  For example, 12 
 
banks like Bank of America and Citibank, were sponsors of many off-balance sheet vehicles issuing ABCP.  
In July 2007, outstanding ABCP equaled $1.2 trillion, accounting for the largest part (55%) of the $2.2 
trillion commercial paper market, up from only 20% of the market in 1997.  The first sign of a systemic 
liquidity freeze was the sharp tumble in outstanding ABCP by 17% from July to August 2007 (roughly 
$200 billion).  This drop was essentially a run by investors in ABCP that refused to reinvest when the 
ABCP matured and ABCP issuance came to a halt (Covitz et al, 2009).  Even ABCP conduits that suffered 
material credit deterioration were brought on to sponsors’ balance sheets beginning in August 2007. As 
a result, the recourse and credit guarantees provided by sponsors ended up covering 97% of maturing 
ABCP (Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez, 2009).             
Third, all banks, not just banks with a concentrated exposure to mortgage-related securities, 
suffered in the crisis due to the panic that developed from a lack of information and loss of confidence 
(Gorton, 2008).  Indeed, Rajan (2005) was prescient about the transmission of the 2007-2009 crisis.  He 
argued that the reason banks were able to honor their credit lines when the commercial paper market 
dried up in 1998 was because banks were not perceived as credit risks themselves so that funds flowed 
into banks.  But he went on to say that if “banks also face credit losses and there is uncertainty about 
where those losses are located, only the very few unimpeachable banks will receive the supply of 
liquidity fleeing other markets.  If these banks also lose confidence in their liquidity-short brethren, the 
inter-bank market could freeze up, and one could well have a full blown financial crisis.” 
Finally, in addition to banks’ direct exposure via credit losses and support to ABCP conduits, 
banks experienced the standard drawdown of commitments from nonfinancial borrowers shut out of 
the commercial paper and other securities markets (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010, Montoriol-Garriga 
and Sekeris, 2009, and Gao and Yun, 2009, provide empirical support based on firm-level data).  This 
increase in demand for liquidity took place in two waves:  In the first wave, the commercial paper 
spread first reached over 100 basis points in August 2007, and a second wave of market stress took hold 
in September 2008, following the Lehman bankruptcy and the failures of other financial institutions, as 
commercial paper spreads shot up above 200 basis points and outstanding unsecured commercial paper 
dropped 13% from a month earlier.  
4.2. Deposit Inflows and Funding Pressure 
To examine deposit flows, we employ data from the Federal Reserve H8 release of balance 
sheet data for weekly commercial bank reporters.  The deposit data, although aggregated, are 
sufficiently rich to support a number of stylized facts summarized in Charts 4-6.   13 
 
First and as evident in Chart 4, net deposit inflows were not especially robust in the first phase 
of the financial crisis: from the ABCP freeze in the summer of 2007 to just before the Lehman failure on 
September 15, 2008.
10  Thus, it would be over-simplifying to lump together the 2007-09 crisis into one 
period and compare deposits before and after the crisis.  Second, it would also be over-simplifying to 
conclude that core deposits were stable throughout the crisis even if non-core deposits (such as large 
time deposits) were not.  Third, there was considerable heterogeneity across large and small banks.  We 
take up these points in greater detail in what follows. 
Table 1 shows an extract of cumulative growth statistics for insured, core and large-time 
deposits, respectively, based on the quarterly Call Report balance sheet data over the period 2007:Q3-
2009:Q1 (see Appendix Table A2 for full detail).  As first noted in the Introduction, core and insured 
deposit growth rates were, in fact, muted in the first year of the crisis.  For example, insured deposits 
registered a cumulative growth of only 1% (1.7%) at small (large) banks over the four quarters, 2007:Q3 
– 2008:Q2.  Within the subset of small banks, core deposits fell in this period, where cumulative core 
deposit growth equaled -0.5%.  The weak behavior of core deposit growth is striking in light of the 
substantial easing of monetary policy during the 2007-09 crisis.  From September 2007 to April 2008, the 
federal funds target was reduced by 3.25 percentage points, and the 3-month Treasury bill rate fell 
nearly three points.  Such a reduction in market interest rates (the opportunity cost of deposits) usually 
leads to faster growth in core deposits. 
In contrast, only in the aftermath of the Lehman failure and the jump in aggregate uncertainty 
(as proxied by the implied volatility VIX index in Chart 4), did deposit funds sharply increase.   For 
example, deposits shot up by $188.6 billion dollars in the week of September 17, 2008 relative to the 
previous week, while the VIX reached 36 from 24 the previous week.  This deposit surge after the 
Lehman failure was visible across both types of deposits and at both large and small banks, though it 
was marked at the large banks (Charts 5-6).  These deposit inflows reflected the acute flight to safety 
out of money market funds immediately after the Lehman failure.  While banks remained heavily 
exposed to losses on real estate loans and mortgage-related securities, other institutions, especially 
money market funds, were suddenly perceived to be even riskier.  For example, the Reserve Primary 
Fund, a prime money market mutual fund with close to $800 million of exposure to Lehman commercial 
paper, managed to “break the buck” on September 16, 2008 when its net asset value fell below $1.  This 
                                                            
10 This is in contrast to deposit inflows into banks during the crisis of 1998 (see Table 7 and the evidence in section 
5.5).  Similar evidence of weak deposit growth in the first year from August 2007 and the contrast with 1998 is 
documented in Ashcraft, Bech and Frame (2010), who show that investor funds in 2007 shifted to purchasing 
Treasury securities or government-backed agency securities.   14 
 
event led to redemption demands across the money market mutual fund industry―in an amount close 
to $200 billion―as well as to a reallocation of funds to safer Treasury-only funds (Adrian et al, 2010; 
Kacperczyck and Schnabl, 2010; Federal Reserve Bulletin, 2009).
11  At the same time, households 
withdrew assets from the stock market and mutual fund shares, which also took a hit around the same 
time.   
Deposit growth was then supported by the adoption of emergency measures by the 
government.  The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (TARP) that passed in Congress on October 3, 
2008 provided greater explicit government support of the financial system, including an increase in the 
deposit insurance limit from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor.  This change was followed on October 
14 with the FDIC’s announcement of its temporary liquidity guarantee program.  The FDIC stood willing 
to guarantee newly issued senior unsecured debt of banks and thrifts and to fully cover noninterest 
bearing deposit transaction accounts, largely held by businesses.  Together with other implicit 
guarantees of the financial system, these measures assured depositors that the banking system would 
hold up. As a result, deposits poured into banks. 
While the focus of this paper is not on lending (see, for example, Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; 
Cornett, McNutt, Strahan and Tehranian, 2011; Gozzi and Goetz, 2010; Mora, 2010), a number of 
stylized facts stand out in support of deposit funding pressure relative to lending needs.  First, bank 
loans increased in the first year of the crisis reflecting loan commitment takedowns and mortgage loans 
that were warehoused because they could no longer be securitized (large banks also appreciably 
increased their holdings of MBS and ABS securities and trading assets as shown in Table A2 and He, 
Khang and Krishnamurthy, 2010).  Second, this lending growth outpaced core deposit funding growth 
(Chart 6 and Table A2).  Banks, especially small banks, drew down liquid asset buffers to support lending 
and the buildup of assets (Table A2 and Chart 6).  Loan growth would have had to slow even more if 
banks had not also turned to other sources of funds to make up for the shortfall in deposit growth, 
which included borrowing from the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System and the Federal Reserve 
System.
12   
                                                            
11 While only the Reserve Primary Fund halted redemptions on September 16, 2008, other funds were close to 
halting redemptions, which was averted by the U.S. Treasury announcement on September 19 of an explicit 
guarantee on all money market investments made prior to the Lehman failure.  For example, a number of troubled 
funds (such as Columbia, Dreyfus, General, ING and Morgan Stanley) filed petitions with the SEC, which in turn 
issued no-action letters, indicating that the sponsor provided financial support to its fund (see Kacperczyk and 
Schnabl, 2011). 
12 Federal Home Loan Banks are government-sponsored entities able to issue debt at cheaper rates than banks (at 
least in the first year of the crisis) and re-intermediate these funds by lending them to commercial banks and 
thrifts (Ashcraft et al, 2010).  Indicative of the extent to which the U.S.-chartered commercial banking system was 15 
 
5.  BANK-LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM THE 2007-09 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
We now turn to empirical tests of the hypotheses sketched out in Section 3 concerning the 
factors that are expected to influence a bank’s decision to actively manage its deposit rates.  As 
discussed in Section 4, deposit funding pressure appears to have been more intense in the first part of 
the crisis.  Therefore, the variable crisis in the testable hypotheses is empirically represented by two 
dummy variables, crisis1 and crisis2.  Crisis1 refers to the period from 2007:Q3 to 2008:Q2, while crisis2 
refers to the period from 2008:Q3 to 2009:Q2.  That is, the regressions allow bank behavior to differ in 
the early and late stages of the recent crisis, as represented by the interaction terms between bank 
fundamentals or industry effects and crisis1 or crisis2.   
Several sets of regressions are estimated using observations on the deposit rates of individual 
banks from 1990 through 2009.  These regressions are followed by a look at quantities, as reflected by 
deposit growth and its endogenous determination with deposit rates.  Next, the interdependence of 
bank rates is examined.  We end by revisiting the results in Gatev and Strahan (2006) on banks’ 
advantage in the provision of liquidity insurance when market conditions are stressed.   
5.1. Data and variable description 
The Appendix provides a detailed description of regression variables, and summary statistics 
follow in Table A1.  Most bank-level variables are from the quarterly Reports of Condition and Income 
that banks file with regulators (Call Reports).  Banks belonging to a common holding company are 
aggregated to the top holder and treated as a single banking organization (following Kashyap, Rajan and 
Stein, 2002; Gatev and Strahan, 2006).  Therefore, any reference to a “bank” in the remainder of this 
discussion should be taken to mean a banking organization.  The panel is unbalanced and merger effects 
are controlled for by excluding observations when the quarterly growth rate of a bank’s total assets 
exceeds a certain threshold—in this case, 10% (e.g., Gatev and Strahan, 2006).  The sample excludes the 
smallest banks with assets less than $100 million.  Growth rates as well as implicit deposit rates 
calculated from the Call Reports are winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles to mitigate the effect of 
outliers.  The regressions include fixed effects for both banks and time (quarterly time dummies), 
although robustness checks are also carried out on a pooled sample without bank fixed effects.  
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.    
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
reliant on federal sources of funds, Federal Reserve loans rose $559 billion from 2007:Q4 to 2008:Q4, compared 
with a total net increase in bank liabilities of $1,421 billion.  The FHLB stepped in earlier, with their loans increasing 
$261 billion from 2007:Q3 to 2008:Q3 (Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds Table F.110 for U.S. chartered commercial 
banks).   16 
 
The primary deposit rates used in the analysis are the rates on large-time deposits and the rates 
on core deposits.  These are implicit rates based on quarterly Call Report data, defined as interest 
expenses on deposits divided by the quarterly average of the respective interest-bearing deposits. 
As briefly outlined in Section 3, deposit rates are expected to be sensitive to a bank’s liquidity 
and solvency risk especially when funding conditions are stressed.  The liquidity measures employed in 
the analysis are proxies for liquidity demand risk, liquid assets, and wholesale funding.  The solvency 
measures are nonperforming loans, capital, and a large bank indicator for institutions perceived to be 
less vulnerable to insolvency risk.  We describe these measures at greater length below. 
First, exposure to liquidity demand is measured by a bank’s unused commitments ratio, which is 
defined as the ratio of unused loan commitments to the sum of loans and unused commitments.  
Unused loan commitments are the parts of credit lines that have not been drawn down, and include, for 
example, support to ABCP program conduits that the bank does not consolidate on its balance sheet (as 
described in the notes to schedule RC-L on the Call Reports).  The rationale for measuring a bank’s 
liquidity demand exposure by the unused commitment ratio is that the more commitments a bank has 
outstanding, the more exposed it will be to a drawdown of commitments when market conditions 
tighten.  But the key finding of previous studies is that more exposed banks are not, in fact, more fragile 
but instead serve as liquidity backstops.  While these banks converted a lot of the off-balance sheet 
commitments to on-balance sheet loans, they experienced a more than offsetting inflow of funds into 
deposit accounts in times of market stress.   
Second, banks holding a larger buffer of liquid assets or with a low dependence on wholesale 
funding are expected to be less vulnerable to runs and potential failure.  Liquid assets are assets such as 
cash, federal funds sold and securities that can be easily converted to cash to pay off drawn deposits 
and credit lines.  Because of the sudden illiquidity of mortgage-backed securities and other structured 
securities in the 2007-09 financial crisis, and following Cornett et al (2011), the liquid asset measure 
excludes MBS and ABS.  Wholesale funds (also known as managed liabilities in the Federal Reserve 
Bulletins) are liabilities excluding core deposits. 
Third, solvency and capital adequacy measures are captured by the bank’s capital-to-asset ratio 
(which can be measured in various ways, including a leverage-type measure or a Basel risk-based ratio) 
and the bank’s nonperforming loan ratio.  Well-capitalized banks and banks with a low share of 
nonperforming loans are less likely to fail because capital can serve as a buffer when unexpected losses 
occur.  While these different measures of solvency are correlated, it is not evident, a priori, which 
measure empirically constrains banks the most.  For example, banks may pay close attention to their 17 
 
regulatory risk-based capital ratios and disregard overall leverage to an extent, since regulatory 
interventions are often contingent on the regulatory risk-based ratios.  Investors may, however, 
recognize that risk-based ratios are to a large extent “managed” by banks, and thus pay close attention 
also to overall leverage ratio.  In addition, for the subset of publicly traded banks, we collect measures of 
the market value of capital to asset ratio, and equity returns and volatility as a robustness check.       
Finally, perceived solvency risk is driven by implicit guarantees of certain banks.  For example, 
large banks may be big enough to be considered by investors as “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF).   Large banks 
are captured in the regressions by an indicator for the 25 largest banks as measured by asset size.
13  One 
caveat on deposit rates is that U.S. bank regulations exist to restrict the rates that less than well-
capitalized banks can offer (Federal Deposit Insurance Act section 29, and FDIC rules and regulations 
section 325.103 for capital category definitions).  These deposit rate caps are, therefore, expected to 
dampen the sensitivity of a bank’s deposit rates to its riskiness. This effect, once a bank is under prompt 
corrective action, should however go against finding statistically and economically significant effects.
14 It 
is, nonetheless, possible that a bank anticipating that it will soon be classified as less than well-
capitalized may have an incentive to be “active” earlier by raising its rates to attract deposits. 
5.2. Deposit Rates and Bank Fundamentals 
This section focuses on the results of the first two hypotheses laid out in Section 3.  Table 2 
shows the results for subsequent bank failure and Table 3 expands the set of factors that proxy for a 
bank’s vulnerability to liquidity and solvency risks.  Deposit rate behavior surrounding the time of failure 
is in Panel A of Table 2 and deposit flows are in Panel B.  The first three columns of Panel A are for the 
rates on large time deposits and the last three columns are for the rates on core deposits.  Each 
dependent variable is associated with three models that differ in how the explanatory variable, failure, is 
defined: First, failure is limited to regulatory-assisted failures (“formal fail”).  Second, failure is inclusive 
of “formal fails” and “near-fails” (the latter are as defined in the Introduction and for Chart 1 – the first 
period in which a bank’s equity return was worse than -90% over the previous 18 months using daily 
                                                            
13 This cutoff follows the H8 criteria.  Results are very similar if the cutoff is based on total deposits instead of total 
assets.  Results are also similar for other cutoffs, such as the largest 10 banks. 
14 We find that the results of the next section are not sensitive to excluding banks meeting the prompt corrective 
action criteria.  It is worth pointing out, however, that the rule applies to a small group of financial institutions: For 
example, only 248 out of more than 8200 banks were less than well-capitalized as of 2009:Q1 (see 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09082.html). In particular, none of IndyMac, WaMu or Wachovia 
were less than well-capitalized with the possible exception of IndyMac based on its final quarterly statement.  Also, 
the rule governing deposit rate restrictions was ambiguous allowing banks leeway in their interpretation of the 
local market.  As a result, the FDIC amended section 29 of the act in May 2009, effective January 2010. 18 
 
CRSP data).  Finally, the third model is limited to near-fails in order to determine the behavior of rates 
and flows after “failure”.  Because “formal fails” drop out of the sample after failure, this model is 
evaluated on near-fails only.  In total, there are 517 unique bank “formal” failures represented in the 
Call Report sample covering the period 1991-2009, and 91 near-fails, of which 16 overlap as both near-
fails and subsequent formal fails (note that bank failures, in particular the near-fails, are concentrated in 
the 2007-2009 crisis). 
The results in the top panel of Table 2 are supportive of the first hypothesis: Premiums on 
deposit rates were positive in the period leading up to a bank’s failure.  And these premiums typically 
increased as the bank was about to fail.  For example, as shown in column (2), the premium on large-
time deposits steadily rose from an insignificant 0.5 basis points (bp) four quarters before failure to 5.1 
bp one quarter before failure (where failure is inclusive of formal and near-fails).  Note that these 
coefficients can be interpreted as premiums above average rates as the panel regressions include 
quarterly time dummies, in addition to controlling for District-time trends, geographic deposit market 
concentration, and bank fixed effects.  What is interesting is that higher deposit rates were not limited 
to large time deposits, but also characterized core deposit rates.  For example, the premium reached 8.7 
bp on core deposits in the period of failure (column (5)).  Moreover, higher rates persisted after the 
quarter of near-failure.  For example, banks like Citibank that experienced large drops in market value at 
the end of 2008 continued to pay out higher rates in the ensuing quarters (column (6)).
15           
In Panel B of Table 2, overall deposit quantities are in the first three columns and insured 
deposits are in the last three columns.  Depositors withdrew total deposits leading up to a bank’s failure.  
For example, as shown in column (2), quarterly deposit growth decreased from about -0.5 percentage 
point to -3.4 percentage points in the last quarter for inclusive fails (and more so for formal fails as 
shown in column (1)).  A key difference is in the behavior of insured deposits: Despite an overall deposit 
drain prior to failure, these banks were able to attract insured deposit inflows.  This attests to the role of 
deposit guarantees in weakening depositor discipline.  However, this inflow was overturned in the last 
quarter before failure (columns (4) and (5)), and interestingly, persistent outflows from insured deposit 
accounts were seen after failure in the case of near-fails (column (6)).  Overall, therefore, the results 
                                                            
15 Note that these results characterize average (implicit) rates on a bank’s large-time or core deposit accounts, and 
therefore represent a lower bound on deposit promotions. The premiums are larger if one focuses on current 
offered rates.  This information is not reported on the Call Reports, but is available from a participatory-based 
weekly survey on a selection of banks (Chart 1).  In the latter case, premiums rose significantly in the week of 
failure to, for example, 30 bp on new 12-month CD rates (after also controlling for weekly time dummies, bank 
fixed effects, and the other market controls). 19 
 
presented in Table 2 are in line with the hypothesis that banks about to fail experienced increasingly 
large deposit outflows and reacted by raising deposit rates in an effort to stem the loss.      
The second hypothesis outlined in Section 3 is that deposit funding pressure during the crisis 
should show up also across different banks.  While most banks did not fail, there was considerable 
variation in a bank’s vulnerability to the risk of illiquidity or of insolvency.  To test this hypothesis, the 
specifications in Table 3 include two sets of bank characteristics, liquidity measures and solvency 
measures, as described at the beginning of this section.  The sample is quarterly from 1996 through 
2009 (this sample period also applies for the regressions in the subsequent tables, unless otherwise 
noted).  Unused commitments are available from 1990 but the Basel risk-based capital ratio is only 
defined from 1996.  In addition, the deposit market concentration control is from the FDIC’s Summary of 
Deposits, available from 1994.  Likewise, liquid assets are defined to exclude MBS and ABS securities, 
and the latter are only reported from 1994.  The first two columns of Table 3 report the results for large 
time deposits followed by core deposits in columns (3) and (4).   
The results indicate that banks that raised deposit rates were those vulnerable to liquidity risk, 
especially in the first year of the crisis.  The key coefficient of interest, for example, is the interaction 
term of unused commitments with the dummy variable indicating the first year of the crisis, unused 
commitment ratio x crisis1.  For example, banks with a greater amount of unused commitments 
outstanding offered significantly higher deposit rates in that period: columns (1) and (2) show that a 0.1 
increase in the unused commitment ratio raises the large time deposit rate by 1.4-1.8 bp.   Banks 
exposed to liquidity demand even raised rates on core deposits in this phase of the crisis in a 
specification without bank fixed effects in column (4).  In the second year of the crisis, funding pressures 
eased and these banks offered significantly lower rates.  Similarly, banks relying on wholesale funding, 
also sought to attract deposits by raising rates, particularly in the first year of the crisis (e.g., column (3) 
shows that a 0.1 increase in the wholesale funding ratio is associated with a 1.3 bp increase in the core 
deposit rate).  Finally, banks holding more liquid assets were able to offer lower rates on core deposits.   
Bank measures closely related to solvency also helped to lower rates.  Banks with higher 
nonperforming loans typically pay significantly higher deposit rates and this sensitivity went up further 
during the crisis, especially in the latter part of the crisis as nonperforming loans accumulated, as 
reflected by the coefficient on the double interaction term, NPL x crisis2.   
Measures of a bank’s capital adequacy enter as expected in normal times.  Specifically, the 
regressions include two measures of capital adequacy, the book capital-to-asset ratio and a Basel total 
risk-based capital ratio.  However and especially in the first year of the crisis, well capitalized banks by 20 
 
the capital to asset ratio raised rates (or offered a lower discount from before).
 16  For example, a 0.1 
increase in the capital-to-asset ratio led to an increase in the large time deposit rate by 4.6 bp (column 
(1)).  In contrast, well capitalized banks by the Basel risk-based measure lowered rates during this 
period.  The direction of these effects is not sensitive to including these measures jointly or separately in 
the regressions.    
One interpretation is that banks are sensitive to regulatory intervention and adjust their deposit 
rates upwards when regulatory risk-based capital positions deteriorate.  At the same time, the evidence 
that banks with higher book capital to asset ratios offered higher rates in the first year of the crisis may 
reflect the greater ability and better position these healthier banks were in to increase lending in the 
crisis (for example, in results later discussed, there is evidence that banks with a high capital ratio 
increased lending more in the crisis, but only banks with higher risk-based capital ratios were able to 
attract more deposits overall).
17   
Finally, banks enjoying implicit support such as the TBTF institutions generally pay lower rates, 
and were also associated with lower deposit rates during the crisis, particularly during the first year.  For 
example, large banks lowered rates by 5-17 basis points in the first year of the crisis and the effect is 
statistically significant for core deposits (columns (3) and (4)).
18  Alternatively, bank size can be 
measured by the log of total assets; albeit this is a less direct measure of implicit guarantees than the 
TBTF indicator.  In similar specifications and including log assets, the interaction terms on size and the 
crisis are likewise negative and statistically significant. 
The upshot of the results in Table 3 is that banks actively respond to their deteriorating 
positions – whether liquidity demand risk or solvency risk – by offering higher deposit rates.  The effect 
of bank riskiness on deposit rates was particularly amplified during the crisis because of the direct 
negative impact the crisis had on the banking system as outlined in Section 4.   
We also arrive at compatible results when using an alternative data source, which is based on a 
proprietary survey of current rates (mostly on CDs) of banks and thrifts conducted at the weekly 
frequency by Bank Rate Monitor (Bank Rate Monitor®, N. Palm Beach, FL 33408, all rights reserved). This 
                                                            
16 Results are also similar if the total book capital to asset ratio is replaced with higher quality capital such as 
tangible capital or tangible common capital ratios. 
17 Alternatively, one can also examine the market value of equity to asset ratio (and market equity returns) for the 
subset of banks with publicly traded equity data from CRSP (see Appendix Table A5).     As expected, banks with 
higher market equity returns (and lower volatility of daily returns) decreased deposit rates in the crisis.  However, 
banks with higher market capital ratios raised large time deposit rates in the first phase (but the effect is not 
statistically significant), possibly because these banks were increasing lending during the crisis.      
18 We continue to find a TBTF effect even if we eliminate banks with assets less than $1 billion.  Banks above $1 
billion in assets have roughly similar core and insured deposit profiles as the largest banks.   21 
 
survey has a number of advantages and disadvantages: Its main advantage is that the reported rates are 
current (not average balance) rates.  However, the survey is on a selection of banks and is largely 
participation based.  As a result, the sample covers only about 214 bank holding companies of more 
than 4000 in the Call Reports, and these have a larger average asset size and are concentrated in 
metropolitan areas (and the included banks may choose to stop reporting rates during the sample).
19   
The results using the Bank Rate Monitor data are shown in Appendix Table A3; where the panel 
is a bank-week panel over the period 1997-2009 and the liquidity and solvency measures are as before 
(lag values are nonetheless quarterly because bank characteristics are from the Call Reports).  The 
results indicate that, particularly for those banks with a high insolvency risk, the covariates are 
statistically significant and have the hypothesized economic effect in times of market stress (these 
covariates are unused commitments, liquid assets, nonperforming loans, and size).  For example, large 
banks paid up to 25 basis points lower CD rates in this crisis and a 0.01 increase in the fraction of 
nonperforming loans pushed up rates by close to 20 basis points (as shown in columns (1), (2), (5) and 
(6)). 
5.3. Deposit Inflows and the Joint Determination of Deposit Rates and Flows 
We next turn to evaluating the responsiveness of deposit flows to a bank’s risks of illiquidity and 
insolvency.  Results of deposit growth regressions are shown in Table 4 for several deposit types, 
including total deposits and two measures of “stable” deposits (core and insured deposits).  The 
motivating question is whether deposit inflows respond to bank riskiness and whether the association 
changed in the crisis.  The data on aggregate deposits suggested that the banking system as a whole was 
not particularly able to attract deposits in the first phase of the crisis.  Such a shortfall in overall deposit 
inflows would be of special concern if deposit inflows at banks with high exposure to liquidity demand 
did not increase as much relative to other banks as in past events of turmoil (despite their offering 
higher rates as shown in the previous section).   
The regression results confirm that such a shift in relative deposit growth occurred in the first 
phase of the recent crisis.  For example, the interaction term of unused commitments with the first year 
of the crisis, unused commitment ratio x crisis1, enters negatively for both total and core deposit growth 
in columns (1) and (2) (implying that a 0.1 increase in the exposure to unused commitments is 
                                                            
19 The data are also subject to a number of irregularities as noted by Driscoll and Judson (2009); these include 
duplicates for the same branch and missing observations input as zeros.  The data are, therefore, cleaned as best 
as possible to correct for these discrepancies.  A second caveat is that the rate data represent the lower end of 
rates offered by deposit type.     22 
 
associated with close to a 0.1 percentage point decline in deposit growth).  Although not statistically 
significant, it was nonetheless the case that banks with unused commitments did not have a systematic 
advantage at gaining deposits, unlike previous episodes of stress (this issue is explored further in Section 
5.5).   
Consistent with these findings, banks seeking brokered deposits and choosing to participate in 
the FDIC’s transaction account guarantee program at the end of 2008 were those that had a high unused 
commitment ratio (columns (4) and (5)).  This program was part of the FDIC’s temporary liquidity 
guarantee program announced on October 14, 2008.  The FDIC stood willing to guarantee newly issued 
senior unsecured debt of banks and thrifts and to fully cover noninterest bearing deposit transaction 
accounts, largely held by businesses.  Those banks choosing to participate paid an extra premium for the 
additional insurance (the results are robust to controlling for the share of transaction deposits).   
Other results are mostly in line with priors, despite the fact that a regression of deposit 
quantities on fundamentals may produce ambiguous effects: Weak fundamentals cause depositors to 
take their deposits elsewhere but banks respond by actively raising rates (see Chart 3 and the discussion 
in the introduction and Section 3.1).  This endogeneity issue is next addressed in Table 5.  Nonetheless 
and accepting that the estimated coefficients in Table 4 may be obscuring quantity effects, more liquid 
banks gained deposits as did better capitalized and large banks.  For example, large banks experienced 1 
percentage point greater deposit growth (column (1)).  This differential effect is considerable, 
considering that average quarterly deposit growth over the sample was 1.1 percent (Appendix Table 
A1).  Collectively, these findings imply that banks were not indiscriminately seen as safe havens during 
this crisis.   
Next, we examine the endogeneity of deposit rates and flows in a test of the third hypothesis 
from Section 3.  In particular, we address the concern that rates on deposits are pushed down by 
deposit inflows at the same time that deposits are gained by offering higher rates in Table 5.  Panel A 
traces out the downward sloping curve with the deposit rate as a function of deposit growth, the “bank 
supply” curve.  As discussed in Section 3, in order to tease out this effect, deposits of nearby failed banks 
are used as an instrument for deposit growth.  The results of the first stage indicate that, as expected, 
the failed deposit share positively influences deposit growth, particularly insured deposits, which are 
arguably more sensitive to deposit inflows from failed banks seeking a safe haven.  The latter significant 
effect implies that a 0.1 increase in the failed deposit market share leads to a 1 percentage point 
increase in insured deposit growth (column (2)).  The second stage regression is shown in column (3).  In 
line with the hypothesis, rates go down as insured deposits pour into banks: so that a 1 percentage 23 
 
point increase in deposit growth pushes rates down by 1.25 basis points.  This negative relationship was 
weaker during the crisis (as captured by the double interaction terms, deposit growth x crisis1 and 
deposit growth x crisis2 shown in column (4)).  Finally, the coefficients on the other terms capturing 
bank’s liquidity and solvency are robust and similar to Table 3.    
In order to trace out the upward sloping demand for deposit growth as a function of the deposit 
rate (the “depositor demand” curve), we use the TED spread to instrument for the deposit rate in Panel 
B of Table 5.  The results of the first stage are consistent with the prior: For example, a 100 basis point 
increase in the TED spread pushes the deposit rate up by 35 basis points (column (2)).  The second stage 
results in column (3) show that the deposit rate has a positive and statistically significant effect on rates.  
The coefficient estimate is equal to 0.004, significant at the 1% level, implying that a one standard 
deviation in the deposit rate leads to a 0.16 percentage point increase in quarterly deposit growth.  
Interestingly, the sensitivity of deposit growth appears to have been greater to the deposit rate in the 
crisis with positive and significant coefficients on the interaction terms, large-time rate x crisis1 and 
large-time rate x crisis2, as shown in column (4).   
Finally, it is worth noting that accounting for the reaction of the deposit rate, uncovers a 
stronger relationship between deposit quantities and fundamentals that was partly masked in the 
results in Table 4.  For example, the second stage results imply a greater effect on deposit outflows from 
unused commitments in the first year of the crisis, which is now significant at the 10% level (column (3)).  
Similarly, the coefficient on the interaction term of wholesale funding with crisis1 is -0.003 to -0.009 in 
columns (3) and (4) compared with -0.002 in column (1) of Table 4 (that is, up to a 0.09 percentage point 
contraction in deposit growth for a 0.1 increase in the wholesale funding ratio).  Likewise, deposit 
inflows into large banks are estimated to have been even greater in the first year of the crisis; 1.1 to 1.4 
percentage points compared with 1 percentage point in Table 4, which was contaminated by the effect 
that large banks also lowered rates.  To summarize, we have shown that deposit rates and quantities are 
jointly determined, and banks can mitigate a deposit drain by raising their rates.  
A final mention in this section goes to additional tests documenting bank lending and liquidity 
management in the crisis.  The results are very similar to those obtained in recent studies including 
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Cornett et al (2011) and Gozzi and Goetz (2010), and are therefore not 
shown in the interest of space.  For example, banks reliant on more stable deposit funding, such as 
insured deposits, (or those with greater deposit inflows) were able to expand lending growth in the 
crisis.  Well capitalized and liquid banks were also better able to support lending.  In addition, banks with 
existing unused commitments increased loan growth in the first year of the crisis.  This result may reflect 24 
 
involuntary lending as commitments were converted to loans.  At the same time, these banks with 
greater existing exposure to unused commitments had more leeway in reducing overall credit (the sum 
of unused commitments and loans), as they cut back on the extension of new loan commitments.   
5.4. The Interdependence of Rates: Industry and Geographic Market Effects 
Having devoted considerable attention to the relationship between a bank’s deposit rates and 
its own fundamentals, it is interesting to consider how rates are shaped by the behavior of other banks 
in the system as well as the geographic market where the bank is located.  In this section, we present 
the results for hypotheses 4 through 6 from Section 3.   
First and in its simplest form, interdependence between bank rates implies that, controlling for 
fundamentals and other market controls, a bank’s deposit rate will be forced upwards when other banks 
offer higher rates.  Digging deeper at this hypothesis, one reason that other banks may raise their rates 
is because they are likely to fail (as shown in Table 2).  Therefore, it is natural to expect that if a bank is 
located in a geographic market with a high share of deposits in banks that are about to fail, then even a 
healthy bank will face pressure to increase rates in the time period preceding failure.  That is, a bank in 
Pasadena, California would have felt pressure to raise its deposit rates in early 2008 because Pasadena-
based IndyMac was bidding up rates at the time.  As IndyMac got closer to bankruptcy in July 2008, and 
in the immediate aftermath, the pressure on other banks to maintain deposit rate promotions would 
have eased.  Therefore, an alternative representation of hypothesis 4 is the following: 
     
                                …                               ,                   ,         
                       4:     0 ,    …      0 . 
The results of the two specifications for hypothesis 4 are shown in the first two columns of Table 
6.  Panel A corresponds to the rates on large-time deposits and Panel B corresponds to the rates on core 
deposits.  Note that while the IV regression in Table 5 employs the contemporaneous failed deposit 
share as an instrument for a bank’s deposit inflows in the period that other nearby banks failed, the 
specifications shown in Table 6 also capture the behavior of rates leading up to events of failure in the 
local market.  Also note that the regressions in Table 6 control for all the bank liquidity and solvency 
measures, whose presentation is now suppressed in the interest of space.  Finally, the effect of the 
deposit concentration measure is shown in these tables (this measure was included throughout the 
previous regressions, but was not shown as those tables had a different focus).  We also control for local 25 
 
economic conditions in the bank’s geographic market as shown (change in house prices, employment 
and the number of establishments).
20  
The evidence supports the hypothesis of inter-dependence in bank deposit rates.  For example, 
column (1) of Table 6 shows that the coefficients on the 3-4 period lead terms ahead of local market 
failure are positive and statistically significant (e.g., for a 0.1 increase in the failed share of the local 
deposit market, banks increased large time (core) deposit rates by 3.4 (1) basis points one year prior to 
failure).  At the same time, in the quarter that a nearby bank(s) fails (and in the immediately preceding 
quarter), premiums on large time deposit significantly fall.  Similarly, column (2) shows the direct effect 
that other bank rates have on a given bank’s rates.  Interestingly, this sensitivity was significantly 
heightened during the first year of the crisis, as reflected by the term     ,          1.  For example, banks 
increased their large time deposit rate by 5.6 basis points for a 100 basis point increase in the rate of 
other banks (column (2) of Panel A).   
The next two columns test whether banks in more competitive deposit markets offer higher 
rates.  The proxy for a market’s concentration is the HHI index (similar results are obtained if the top 
market share is alternatively used).   The results show that the rates on large-time deposits are generally 
significantly affected by the bank’s local market structure (e.g., the negative coefficient on the HHI term 
in column (3) of Panel A implies that a 0.1 decrease in market concentration is associated with 0.71 bp 
higher rates, and the interaction term with the first year of the crisis was further negative, although not 
statistically significant).  In the case of core deposit rates in Panel B, the market structure does not have 
a significant effect on rates in normal times.  However, there is evidence that even core deposit rates 
were pushed up in more competitive funding markets during this crisis (the coefficients on the double 
interaction terms, HHIi,t x crisis1 and HHIi,t x crisis2, in column (3) of Panel B are negative and statistically 
significant).  Finally and extending the argument one step further, there is evidence that banks in 
competitive deposit markets offer higher rates when other banks raise rates (the coefficient of interest 
for this hypothesis is the triple interaction term,     ,        ,          1 in column (4)).  
The final hypothesis predicts that markets with an exogenously driven abundant supply of 
deposits should have similar effects on deposit rates as a less competitive deposit market structure 
                                                            
20 Note that the results are also robust to controlling for the interaction terms of these variables with the crisis 
periods.  These variables are included as controls only because there are competing effects on how local economic 
conditions should affect deposit rates.  On the one hand, a decline in house prices proxies for an adverse effect on 
household wealth, inducing deposit outflows and pushing up deposit rates.  But house prices are correlated with 
demand, such as employment and other local demand conditions.  In this case, a decline in house prices reflects a 
decline in good opportunities for investment in the local area and therefore for bank lending and the need for 
funds.  This effect would serve to push down deposit rates.   26 
 
would.  We take advantage of the fraction of the population that is made up of seniors, and continue to 
control for the HHI index and local economic conditions in these regressions (the results are robust to 
also controlling for the interaction terms of HHI and local economic conditions with the crisis in, for 
example, column (5)).  The results are supportive of the hypothesis: More seniors in the bank’s 
geographic market helped to insulate its deposit rates and especially in the first year of the crisis (e.g., a 
0.1 increase in the senior share reduced the large time deposit rate by 3.1 bp as shown by the 
coefficient on Seniori,t x crisis1 in column (5) of Panel A).  The results also imply that a dominant senior 
population mitigated the industry pressure coming from other banks promoting higher rates 
(       ,        ,          1 in column (6)).    
 One last model is presented in Appendix Table A4, which exploits branch-level data, albeit for a 
smaller and participation-based selection of banks.  Up to now, the HHI index, the share of seniors, the 
failed deposit share, and local economic conditions have been aggregated to the bank topholder level 
using branch deposit-weighted information from the Summary of Deposits.  For this analysis, the 
geographic market information collected by the Bank Rate Monitor survey (city, state) was hand 
matched to the relevant geographic market (MSA or rural-county) in the Summary of Deposits data.  The 
regressions presented control for the bank’s characteristics and fixed effects at the topholder level but 
branch-level geographic deposit market variation is introduced.  The results indicate that the direct 
effects of geographic characteristics enter as expected, although many of the interactions with the 
stress period are generally not statistically significant.  For example, a branch located in a more 
competitive market reports higher rates but this effect is not amplified in the crisis (column (3)).  
However, there is evidence to support the view that these branches in more competitive markets 
responded in the crisis to a rate increase by other banks (    ,        ,           in column (4)).   
Broadly speaking, these effects are consistent with theoretical models formalizing an interest-
rate contagion that spreads from financially constrained banks to those that compete in funding 
markets with these banks.  In Acharya (2001), poor performance of some banks reduces aggregate 
wealth that in general equilibrium raises borrowing costs for other banks.  Diamond and Rajan (2005) 
show that there can be an aggregate liquidity shortage in which banks seeking liquidity, e.g., by 
liquidating assets, deplete liquidity for other banks raising their cost of borrowing.  Acharya and Skeie 
(2011) consider the possibility that funding-constrained banks hoard liquidity and raise the cost of 
transferring liquidity to even healthy banks in the inter-bank markets.  Our result that banks compete in 
deposit markets and liquidity-seeking banks raise the cost of deposits for other banks is similar in spirit 27 
 
to these alternative contagion channels, which could also be interesting to study but are beyond the 
immediate scope of our paper. 
5.5. Revisiting Gatev and Strahan (2006) 
The results of our paper indicate that the role of the banking system as a stabilizing liquidity 
insurer is an active one.  Banks most vulnerable to greater liquidity demand may not be able to attract 
sufficient deposit inflows to fund commitments and other asset funding needs even by offering higher 
rates, as the findings of Sections 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate.   
One open question is how can these results be reconciled with previous studies’ support for 
banks’ advantage in liquidity provision in crises?  That is, if banks have a natural advantage in providing 
liquidity in crises as posited by this literature, then banks with the greatest exposure to liquidity demand 
are expected to experience the highest growth in deposits and loans in a crisis.  The regression results 
discussed in this section confirm that such a relationship existed in previous episodes of market stress 
but broke down in the 2007-09 financial crisis. 
Table 7 presents some descriptive statistics of average weekly deposit and loan growth 
comparing the 1998 LTCM crisis with the 2007-09 crisis.  The liquidity squeeze that followed the Russian 
sovereign debt default and the failure of the LTCM hedge fund in the fall of 1998 also meant that many 
companies could no longer renew maturing commercial paper.  For example, commercial paper spreads 
reached over 100 bps and outstanding commercial paper issued by nonfinancial companies fell roughly 
7%, by $16 billion (Saidenberg and Strahan, 1999).  These companies turned to the commercial banking 
system as a backstop, and weekly C&I loan growth doubled (from a weekly average of 0.027% in the five 
years preceding the crisis to 0.048% in the fall of 1998).  At the same time, deposits flowed into U.S. 
banks from foreign banks and overseas offices largely because that crisis had its origins outside the U.S. 
as discussed by Saidenberg and Strahan (1999) (e.g., core deposit growth shot up from a weekly average 
of 0.042% to 0.173% in the fall of 1998 as shown in Table 7).
21  In contrast and as already described at 
great length in Section 4, deposit growth was muted in the first year of this crisis as C&I loans went up.               
In order to ensure that differences in model specification are not driving the results, the 
specifications in Table 8 follow very closely those reported in Gatev and Strahan (2006).  The key 
coefficient of interest is the interaction term of unused commitments with the commercial paper 
                                                            
21 This translated to an increase of about $35 billion between end-August and October 1998, further increasing by 
over $100 billion by year end.  Similar evidence of a strong deposit inflow into the domestic banking system 
occurred after the 9/11 attacks as market liquidity dried up and commercial paper spreads rose.  For example, 
total deposits shot up by over $200 billion in the week immediately following September 11, 2001.   28 
 
spread, which proxies for financial market dislocations.  The coefficients on unused commitments x 
stress are positive and statistically significant in both the deposit growth (column (1)) and loan growth 
equations (column (4)) for a sample period over 1991-2000 as in Gatev and Strahan.  These results 
confirm that before the recent crisis, banks most at risk of liquidity demand realizations experienced the 
greatest increase in deposit growth and loan growth when financial markets became stressed.    
The model is extended by allowing for a different effect stemming from a bank’s unused 
commitments on its deposits and loans in this crisis compared with previous episodes of high 
commercial paper spreads and the sample period is, therefore, extended to 2009.  The change in the 
influence of financial stress on banks’ ability to provide liquidity in the recent crisis is captured by the 
triple interaction unused commitments x stress x crisis.  The results in columns (3) and (6) show that the 
coefficients on unused commitments x stress x crisis are mostly negative and statistically significant.
22  
These results generally support the view that banks with high exposure to liquidity demand had less of 
an advantage (a disadvantage in some cases) over other banks in attracting deposits and making loans in 
the recent crisis than in past crises.  For example, before the recent crisis, an increase in the CP spread 
by 100 basis points raised deposit growth 0.22 percentage point more at a bank with a high unused 
commitment ratio than at a bank with a low unused commitment ratio (where high unused 
commitments are taken at the 75
th percentile (0.17) and a low unused commitments are taken at the 
25
th percentile (0.07)).  In contrast, when market liquidity was highly stressed in the first phase of this 
crisis, deposit growth contracted 0.17 percentage point more at a bank with a high unused commitment 
ratio than at a bank with a low ratio. 
Together, the deposit and lending results suggest that the very banks that had offered insurance 
to businesses and households before the crisis in the form of commitments were not as well positioned 
to deliver the promised liquidity.  Lending growth was anemic in this crisis compared with earlier 
episodes of high commercial paper spreads. 
Finally, the deposit rate specifications in the last two columns of Table 8 show that even in the 
period before the 2007-09 crisis when banks were relatively untouched by market turbulence, there is 
evidence that banks exposed to liquidity demand shocks offered higher rates (at least on large time 
deposits) in order to secure adequate deposit inflows in times of market stress.  This helps reconcile the 
findings of Gatev and Strahan that liquid assets increased universally at all banks when commercial 
paper spreads rose (regardless of loan commitment exposure) but that deposit inflows were 
                                                            
22 Columns (3) and (6) also include double interaction terms as a robustness check.  The coefficients of interest are 
those on the triple interaction terms.  (See Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar, 2007, for a similar triple interaction 
model). 29 
 
pronounced at banks with high levels of loan commitments outstanding.  Our results clarify that – even 
before this crisis – banks exposed most to liquidity demand shocks were actively managing deposit rates 
to attract deposit inflows rather than being purely passive recipients of deposits due to flight to safety.  
5.6. Further Robustness 
In our final robustness tests, we assess how banks responded to additional risks of illiquidity and 
insolvency that were revealed by the 2007-2009 financial crisis.  We also evaluate whether and how the 
maturity structure of time deposits was affected by the crisis, and whether a change in the maturity 
structure can explain our findings.  And finally, we address the concern that the use of liquidity and 
solvency measures during the crisis (even with a lag) may be confounded by regulatory changes and 
bank-specific actions.   
The first two columns of Table A5 include two measures closed related to the proximate causes 
of the financial crisis.  First, we include the share of real estate lending in a bank’s loan portfolio.  
Second, in the period before the crisis, banks increasingly relied on liquid loan sale and securitization 
markets to offload real estate loans.  As a result, banks more involved in this activity would be expected 
to face funding pressure once these markets froze.  Therefore, we also include a measure capturing the 
extent of residential mortgages sold (available from 2006).  These two real estate dependence variables 
have the hypothesized positive effect on deposit rates during the crisis (e.g., a one standard deviation in 
a bank’s real estate lending increased its core deposit rate by 1.5 bp in the second year of the crisis, 
column (2)).  The last four columns of Table A5 include market equity returns and volatility for the 
subset of publicly traded banks (results previously discussed in section 5.2). 
Next, we show that banks with a deposit maturity structure tilted toward short-term deposits 
have a greater rollover risk, and offered significantly higher rates in the first year of the crisis to ensure 
continued funding.  For example, column (1) of Table A6 shows that a one standard deviation increase in 
the share of large-time deposits maturing or repricing in less than one year raised the large-time deposit 
rate by over 5 bp.  Moreover, the results in column (3), where the dependent variable is the share of 
short-term time deposits, indicate that the maturity structure shortened for banks more susceptible to 
liquidity demand risk.  For example, banks with more unused commitments appear to have increased 
their share of short-term deposits.  Therefore, it seems unlikely that riskier banks lengthened their 
maturity structure during the crisis (so that the higher deposit rates they paid would reflect that 
maturity shift rather than being an outcome of banks actively seeking deposits for a given maturity 
profile). 30 
 
Finally, to address the potential endogeneity of the liquidity and solvency variables, we include 
their pre-crisis values in the specifications shown in Table A7.  That is, lagged values are used up to 
2007:Q2 and from then on, the values of these variables as of 2007:Q2 are used.  Pre-crisis (2007:Q2) 
characteristics are least likely to be contaminated by regulatory and bank actions taken after the 
beginning of the crisis in order to change risk profiles.  The results are robust to this change and are, in 
fact, strengthened in the case of liquidity variables.  For example, a 0.1 increase in a bank’s pre-crisis 
wholesale funding ratio led to a 0.10 to 0.16 percentage point contraction in deposit growth during the 
crisis (column (3)) compared with an insignificant or even positive effect on deposit growth in the 
baseline results in Table 4.        
6.  RELATION TO THE LITERATURE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
6.1   Related literature 
The findings in this paper help to understand the nature and importance of deposit funding 
shocks for banks in the recent crisis.  There is a well-developed strand of the market discipline literature 
that shows that various types of bank claimholders are able to identify risky banks in a timely manner 
and penalize them by withdrawing funds and raising the costs of additional funds.  In turn, a financial 
firm finds that it cannot borrow additional funds or that the additional funds come at very costly terms, 
it will be forced to adjust its corporate structure and risk-profile. 
Flannery (1998) provides a good review of the capacity of such market mechanisms to supervise 
and remedy excessive risk taking by financial firms.  But to cite just a few most relevant empirical papers 
on market discipline, Hannan and Hanweck (1988) find evidence that rates on partially insured CDs 
reflect bank riskiness; Flannery and Sorescu (1996) and Ashcraft (2008) find evidence of discipline in 
subordinated debt markets; Park and Peristiani (1998), Goldberg and Hudgins (2002), and Maechler and 
McDill (2006) find that riskier financial institutions pay higher interest rates and attract smaller amounts 
of uninsured deposits.  There is also evidence of risk-pricing for insured deposits during the savings and 
loans crisis in the 1980s when the credibility of the savings and loan deposit insurance fund was in doubt 
(Cook and Spellman, 1994). Interestingly, even when deposit insurance is credible, there is evidence of 
discipline by insured depositors.  For example, using proprietary account-level data for a bank that failed 
in 2002, Davenport and McDill (2006) show that most of the deposits that were withdrawn were, in fact, 
from fully insured deposit accounts.        
There is also historical evidence of depositor discipline from the U.S. before the introduction of 
deposit insurance and other regulatory standards.  For example, Calomiris and Wilson (2004) shows that 31 
 
depositors were able to differentiate between banks, as deposit withdrawals in the 1920s and 1930s 
were related to a bank’s risk of default.  Saunders and Wilson (1996) also find that failing-bank deposit 
outflows one year prior to failure still exceeded those at a matched control sample of non-failing banks, 
even during the bank run contagion of the early 1930s.  This finding, together with our findings on 
deposit outflows in the run-up to a bank’s failure, indicate that deposit withdrawals can be one 
interesting predictor of bank failures and distressed acquisitions.    
A group of papers also finds evidence of depositor discipline when looking at other countries in 
modern times.  For example, Schumacher (2000) looks at the effect of the Mexican devaluation in 1994 
on Argentina, which started as a currency run in Argentina.  At the time, Argentina had no deposit 
insurance or other explicit safety nets.  She finds evidence of an informational component of deposit 
withdrawals from ex ante “bad” banks to ex ante “good” banks.  The latter group was made up of banks 
expected to survive the currency run such as large domestic and foreign banks.  Martinez Peria and 
Schmukler (2001) study several Latin American countries and also find evidence in support of depositor 
discipline on both the interest rate dimension and the outflow dimension – including for insured 
deposits and this was because of uncertainty over deposit protection.  In contrast, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2004) focus on whether deposit insurance weakens market discipline in a sample of 30 
countries and find evidence in favor of this view (also supporting Pennacchi, 2006). 
Recently, deposit funding shocks for banks are shown to be of wider relevance by Liu (2011) that 
analyzed the effect of financial crises over the past 20 years globally on banks operating with branches 
in crisis-affected and non-crisis countries.  She finds that banks with deposit exposure cut back lending 
significantly in branches outside the crisis country (funding shock); and the magnitude of this effect is 
twice as large as that stemming from non-depository asset exposure only (capital shock). 
Finally, several recent papers on inter-bank markets also conform to the overall spirit of our 
evidence.  Acharya and Skeie (2011) argue theoretically that banks facing funding constraints would 
raise the cost of lending in inter-bank markets even to healthy banks.  Acharya and Merrouche (2008) 
and Ashcraft, McAndrews and Skeie (2010) show empirically for the UK and the US inter-bank markets, 
respectively, that banks facing funding liquidity problems during 2007-08 hoarded reserves and released 
them to other banks only at extra premium.  The net effect of this was to effectively raise the cost of 
borrowing for other banks in the system.  And, Afonso, Kovner, and Schoar (2010) find evidence of 
pricing and rationing in the federal funds market that is also parallel to our evidence from the retail 
deposit funding market.  For example, using daily transaction-level data on the federal funds segment of 32 
 
the wholesale funding market, they find that banks with high nonperforming loans were more likely to 
be rationed and pay higher spreads.   
6.2   Policy Implications 
Several policy implications follow from our results.  First, banks are not necessarily able to 
adequately fulfill their role as a backstop of liquidity since their own risks may materialize leading to the 
outflow of deposits.  This finding implies that policymakers need to design other – or alternative – 
mechanisms to ensure an uninterrupted supply of credit to creditworthy borrowers.  Ex post, such 
mechanisms could include direct interventions in markets, such as the Federal Reserve’s Commercial 
Paper Funding Facility that helped to support issuance of short-term paper by businesses.  Moreover, 
federal funding of temporary programs to avoid critical disruptions in credit and liquidity may be 
justified, provided they are suitably priced and contingent on bank quality (Acharya and Backus, 2009). 
Second, while it may be desirable for banks to receive inflows of deposits in financial crises so 
that they can meet the extra demand for liquidity, it is nonetheless important from a public policy view 
to understand what is driving these inflows.  If certain banks are seen as a safe haven, not because they 
are necessarily financially sound, but because they are perceived as too big to fail (TBTF), then their risk-
taking incentives will be distorted (see Hoenig, 2009, recently, among others).  Thus, to simultaneously 
contain the moral hazard due to the TBTF perceptions and have large banks continue to serve as a 
source of liquidity during crises, it may be desirable to improve their overall supervision and regulation.  
A part of this improvement should feature better charging for deposit insurance to align 
premiums with still-existing implicit guarantees which encourage banks to take excessive risks and also 
distort competition between banks as shown in this paper.
23  Pennacchi (2006) and Acharya, Santos and 
Yorulmazer (2010) argue that the premium charged should not just be actuarially fair (so the fund 
breaks even on average) but also reflect an additional component so as to discourage moral hazard.  
Some new reforms in this direction have been proposed by the FDIC, following the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010, to make deposit insurance premium more sensitive to the systemic risk of an institution and not 
just to its idiosyncratic risk.  
In the same spirit, another part of the improvement could feature revisions to capital 
requirements whereby banks’ funding as well as insolvency risks are suitably charged, especially when 
they are correlated with an aggregate shock (as proposed in Acharya, 2009, and Acharya, Pedersen, 
                                                            
23 Indeed, risk shifting may be exacerbated if the heightened competition for deposits during a bank-centered crisis 
(as shown in section 5.4) further lowers bank charter values and induces more risk taking on the asset portfolio 
when combined with deposit insurance (see Keeley, 1990).    33 
 
Philippon and Richardson, 2010).  In particular, our results suggest that when bank insolvency fears are 
sufficiently deep, funding risk in the form of drawing down of credit lines and depositor runs can arise.  
This risk is ignored in the current capital requirements (though some attempt is being made to capture 
funding risk under the Basel III requirements). 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
The motivating question of this paper was whether banks can maintain their advantage as liquidity 
providers when they are at the center of a financial crisis.  This argument hinges on deposit inflows, 
seeking a safe haven, providing banks with a natural hedge to fund drawn credit lines and other 
commitments.  Some observers have conjectured that deposit inflows should have been an assured 
stable source of funding even during the 2007-09 financial crisis.   
We examined whether this conjecture was valid.  The main message is that bank deposit funds 
cannot be assumed to be robust to all types of market liquidity stress.  In the crisis of 2007-09, 
depositors shunned banks generally when there was greater uncertainty about the health of banks, 
greater aggregate uncertainty, and uncertainty over whether the government would support the 
financial system.  Only in the aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy, increased distress in other asset 
markets (including MMMFs), and ensuing official liquidity interventions, did deposit inflows become 
vigorous.     
These findings—together with the weak lending growth during the crisis, especially at banks 
most vulnerable to liquidity drawdowns―suggest that banks were not as able to provide liquidity as 
would be implied by theory and evidence from other crises.  The main reason behind this limitation to 
banks’ role as liquidity backstop was that in the initial phase of the crisis, some banks’ funding and 
solvency were significantly impaired, and eventually resulted in a full-blown banking crisis.  The crisis led 
to blanket government guarantees and only following that did deposits fly to banks as safe havens.   
Finally, though we focused on banks in the U.S., due in part to it being the epicenter of the crisis 
and in part given the better availability of banking data, evidence from Europe and the UK appears to 
conform to our findings.  Given that many large European banks were also exposed to the ABCP freeze 
starting August of 2007 (Acharya and Schnabl, 2010), the funding risks of these banks were similar to 
their U.S. counterparts (in most cases worse, as these banks had limited access to the U.S. deposit 
market and government funding such as FHLB advances).  For instance, there was a depositor flight from 
the European periphery to stronger German banks (perceived to have a stronger government backing 34 
 
them).
24  Similarly, while many British depositors increased their funds in Irish banks, drawn by higher 
rates after the Irish government full guarantee  was announced in 2008 (roughly 200 euro billion of total 
370 euro billion deposits were held by non-residents) , several large Irish banks including Bank of Ireland 
and Allied Irish Banks eventually experienced a deposit flight in November 2010.   
In this sense, the financial crisis of 2007-09 was closer to the banking panics of the pre-Federal 
Reserve era in the United States, i.e., it raised concerns about bank funding and solvency to the point 
where we witnessed depositor flight away from banks, but different from crises of that era in that we 
witnessed depositor flight from banks in spite of the presence of deposit insurance up to some limits, an 
extensive apparatus for bank supervision, and somewhat ineffective prudential capital requirements. 
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 These two charts plot the deposit rates of failed banks (and nearly failed banks) adjusted for 
the rates of banks that did not fail over the period 1997-2009.  The underlying data are current 
rates from a weekly survey from Bank Rate Monitor (BRM), available from 1997.  The top 
panel is for all failed banks with available BRM data, and the lower panel focuses on four 
prominent financial institutions that failed (IndyMac, Washington Mutual) or nearly failed 
Wachovia, Citi) in the crisis.  Specifically, relative rates in Chart 1a are the average of the 
difference between rates for 43 failed banks (FDIC regulatory-assisted failures and 
CRSP near-fails) and rates of non-fail banks.  Note that following Acharya, Pedersen, 
Philippon and Richardson (2010), these near-fails correspond to the first date when the 
18-month return was worse than -90% using daily CRSP equity data (e.g., the result was 
September 29, 2008 for Wachovia, which was also the date that its acquisition was announced).  
The x-axis is the time to failure in weeks.  The failure date is the last available weekly (Friday) 
survey date prior to failure.
Chart 1a
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Failed banks (4 FIs): Relative rates
Time to failure (weeks)
Checking account rate
CD 12 month rate
CD 60 month rateThese two charts plot insured and uninsured deposits at failed banks (and nearly failed banks) 
over the period 1990-2009.  The underlying deposit data are from the quarterly Call Reports, 
which include over 500 bank failures.  The x-axis is the time to failure in quarters, where
failure covers both regulatory-assisted failures and near-fails, as measured by large negative 
returns on the market value of equity (specifically, the first date when the 18-month return 
was worse than -90% using daily CRSP data following Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, 
and Richardson, 2010).  Chart 2a plots average insured and uninsured deposit growth at 
failed banks, and similarly Chart 2b plots the ratio of insured and uninsured deposits to 
beginning of period assets; plots account for mergers and the change in insured deposit 
reporting thresholds in 2009:Q3.  Also shown in Chart 2b are the average deposit ratios for 
banks that did not fail, which are plotted over the period 2007:Q1 to 2009:Q1, where 2009:Q1 
also corresponds to the quarter with the most failures over the sample period.
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Ratio of Deposits to Beginning of Period AssetsThis chart plots the joint determination of deposit rates and quantities as the outcome of depositors'
"demand" (the upward sloping curve) and bank "supply" (the downward sloping curve). 
An increase in a bank's riskiness is expected to shift both curves as illustrated.  First, depositors are 
thought to discipline banks for risk-taking behavior by withdrawing funds from deposit accounts, 
as well as by demanding higher deposit rates.  Second, banks exposed to liquidity demand shocks
and at a greater risk of insolvency actively seek deposits by raising rates.
Rates (r) Depositor Demand





This chart illustrates our method for identifying the bank supply curve We use the share of
Chart 3. Equilibrium Deposit Rates and Quantities
Panel A. Illustrating the Effect of an Increase in a Bank's Riskiness
Panel B. Illustrating the Identification Strategy
This chart illustrates our method for identifying the bank supply curve.  We use the share of 
deposits in a bank's local geographic market belonging to failed banks as an instrument for a bank's 
contemporaneous deposit inflows.  This variable is constructed using information on dates of bank 
failures together with branch-level deposit data from the Summary of Deposits.  Exogenous shifts in 
depositor demand stemming from local market bank failures thus identify the bank supply curve. 
A similar strategy is employed to identify the depositor demand curve: We use exogenous shifts 
in the cost of funds from alternative sources (e.g., the LIBOR spread).
Rates (r) Depositor Demand
∆Deposits = f(r, nearby 
failed banks)
Bank Supply
r=f(∆Deposits, cost of 
alternative funds)
DepositsThis chart plots the VIX index (left-axis) and net flows into deposit accounts at commercial banks 
(right-axis) over the period 2005-2009.  The underlying data are the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
for VIX (month-end), and the Federal Reserve H8 release for deposits at domestically chartered 
commercial banks.  The latter deposit flows data are aggregated from weekly to monthly frequency.  
These deposit flows are also corrected for the artificial impact of JP Morgan Chase's acquisition of 
the large thrift, WaMu, reflected in the H8 release of October 1, 2008.
This chart plots net flows into deposit accounts at commercial banks over the period 2005-2009, 
disaggregated by large and small banks, and by core and large-time deposits.  The underlying data 
Chart 4. VIX and Net Flows into Deposits at Commercial Banks
Chart 5. Net Flows into Deposits at Commercial Banks: 
Large and Small Banks, Core and Large-Time Deposits
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are the Federal Reserve H8 release for deposits at domestically chartered commercial banks. The 
latter deposit flows data are aggregated from weekly to monthly frequency.  Large banks in the H8 
release are the largest 25.  For example, inclusion as of mid-2009 was $65 billion asset size. Combined,
large banks held 66% of domestically chartered assets and 60% of deposits.  The deposit flows at the 
large banks are also corrected for the artificial impact of JP Morgan Chase’s acquisition of the large
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Core, Large banks Large-time, Large banks
Core, Small banks Large-time, Small banksThese two charts plot the cumulative growth of key balance sheet assets and liabilities at 
the weekly frequency from July 2007 through the end of 2009 (growth figures are relative 
to the first week of July 2007).The four key series are total deposits, non-deposit borrowing,
loans and leases, and liquid assets (the sum of cash assets, securities, and interbank loans 
extended).  Panel A is for large domestically chartered banks and Panel B is for small 
domestically chartered banks.  The underlying data are the Federal Reserve H8 release for 
deposits at domestically chartered commercial banks.  Large banks in the H8 release are the 
largest 25.  For example, inclusion as of mid-2009 was $65 billion asset size. Combined, 
large banks held 66% of domestically chartered assets and 60% of deposits. The balance 
sheet series at the large banks are also corrected for the artificial impact of JP Morgan's
acquisition of the large thrift, WaMu, reflected in the H8 release of October 1, 2008.
Panel A



















01jul2007 01jan2008 01jul2008 01jan2009 01jul2009 01jan2010
Deposits Borrowing
Loans Liquid Assets
Source: Federal Reserve H8 release
Small banks
2007-2009 Crisis2007Q3 2007Q4 2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1
Panel A. Large Banks (Largest 25 banks, H8 criteria)
Insured deposits 0.1 0.8 1.7 1.7 3.9 4.6 5.6
Core deposits 0.2 2.4 3.8 3.4 6.3 9.7 10.8
Large time deposits 0.6 1.5 1.8 1.3 2.8 2.0 1.2
Panel B. Small Banks 
Insured deposits 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.0 2.3 3.0 2.0
Core deposits -0.4 -0.7 -0.7 -0.5 0.0 0.9 0.5





This table shows an extract of cumulative growth statistics for certain deposit accounts based on the quarterly Call Reports
over the period from 2007:Q3 to 2009:Q1 (see Appendix Table A2 for full balance sheet detail).  Panel A shows the growth in 
insured deposits, core deposits, and large-time deposits over the period relative to initial 2007:Q2 levels for large banks.
Similarly, Panel B shows the deposit growth figures for small banks, and the bottom panel summarizes overall deposit
inflows into the banking system in billions of dollars over the period 2007:Q4-2009:Q1.  These aggregate flow of funds
match the data reported in He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) for the corresponding period (where core deposits are 





Table 1.  Cumulative Deposit Growth During the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis (in %)Panel A.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Large Time Large Time Large Time Core Core Core
Formal Fail All Fail (Formal 
and CRSP)
CRSP Fail Formal Fail All Fail (Formal 
and CRSP)
CRSP Fail
0.010 0.005 0.006 0.087*** 0.065*** 0.042**
(0.018) (0.014) (0.022) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016)
0.036** 0.026** 0.016 0.082*** 0.062*** 0.042***
(0.015) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013)
0.057*** 0.039*** 0.010 0.087*** 0.070*** 0.056***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.021) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014)
0.066*** 0.051*** 0.044 0.082*** 0.074*** 0.074***
(0.018) (0.014) (0.027) (0.016) (0.011) (0.013)
0.059*** 0.035** 0.003 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.104***










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Implicit Rate on Deposits (Call Reports)
Time Period Unit is One Quarter
1 Period after Failure
2 Periods after Failure
3 Periods after Failure
4 Periods after Failure
4 Periods prior to Failure
3 Periods prior to Failure
2 Periods prior to Failure
Table 2. Deposit Interest Rates and Deposit Flows in the Run-up to Bank Failures
Formal Fails are regulatory-assisted failures, where the FDIC is typically appointed the receiver of the failed bank.
CRSP Fails are the period associated with market equity returns worse than -90% over 18-month period (Acharya et al, 2010).
Deposit Flows (Call Reports)
Time Period Unit is One Quarter
1 Period prior to Failure
Period of Failure
Δ Deposits/         
Assetst-1
Δ Deposits/         
Assetst-1
Δ Deposits/         
Assetst-1
Δ Insured Deposits/  
Assetst-1
Δ Insured Deposits/  
Assetst-1
Δ Insured Deposits/  
Assetst-1
Formal Fail All Fail (Formal 
and CRSP)
CRSP Fail Formal Fail All Fail (Formal 
and CRSP)
CRSP Fail
-0.006 -0.005* -0.009** 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
-0.012*** -0.007** -0.001 0.006* 0.007** 0.007
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
-0.012*** -0.005* 0.003 0.001 0.005* 0.009**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
-0.028*** -0.018*** -0.001 0.000 0.006* 0.018***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
-0.048*** -0.034*** -0.013*** -0.018*** -0.006 0.013**









The sample period of the regressions is from 1994 to 2009, using quarterly Call Report data. 
All specifications are panel regressions with fixed effects for bank organizations and time dummies (quarterly).  
All regressions control for the deposit-weighted geographic market deposit concentration (annual from Summary of Deposits), and for District time trends.  
The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are clustered at the bank organization level.
See Appendix for variable definitions and details about bank panel. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively.
4 Periods after Failure
2 Periods prior to Failure
1 Period prior to Failure
Period of Failure
1 Period after Failure
2 Periods after Failure
3 Periods after Failure
4 Periods prior to Failure
3 Periods prior to Failure(1) (2) (3) (4)
Large Time Large Time Core Core
Liquidity measures
0.027 -0.231*** -0.074*** -0.461***
(0.025) (0.029) (0.021) (0.031)
0.144*** 0.178*** -0.011 0.186***
(0.030) (0.038) (0.027) (0.057)
-0.167*** -0.217*** -0.175*** -0.150***
(0.035) (0.040) (0.027) (0.044)
-0.043*** -0.114*** -0.039*** -0.183***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.012) (0.019)
0.017 0.040 -0.112*** -0.146***
(0.021) (0.025) (0.022) (0.028)
-0.042* -0.030 -0.082*** -0.088***
(0.023) (0.027) (0.016) (0.026)
0.124*** 0.123*** -0.068*** 0.257***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.020)
0.032* 0.096*** 0.125*** 0.139***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.028)
-0.060*** 0.006 0.081*** 0.084***
(0.023) (0.027) (0.020) (0.028)
Solvency measures
0.210*** 0.216*** 0.053 0.412***
(0.061) (0.082) (0.043) (0.092)
-0.131 0.045 0.194*** 0.443*
(0.116) (0.130) (0.064) (0.229)
0.319*** 0.450*** 0.278*** 0.468***
(0.078) (0.100) (0.051) (0.112)
-0.256** 0.009 -0.513*** 0.093
(0.101) (0.094) (0.084) (0.095)
0.461*** 0.479*** 0.161 0.091
(0.087) (0.110) (0.124) (0.171)
0.083 -0.038 0.013 -0.179
(0.126) (0.141) (0.083) (0.138)
0.029 -0.053 -0.001 -0.025
(0.054) (0.050) (0.031) (0.045)
-0.201*** -0.240*** -0.052 -0.015
(0.054) (0.080) (0.090) (0.098)
-0.134 -0.114 0.047 0.051
(0.094) (0.077) (0.044) (0.076)
-0.019 -0.056 0.005 -0.099***
(0.032) (0.037) (0.026) (0.024)
-0.046 -0.061 -0.080*** -0.167***
(0.035) (0.043) (0.018) (0.024)
-0.038 -0.039 -0.012 -0.040*
(0.027) (0.039) (0.018) (0.024)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No
Observations 176427 176427 176459 176459
R
2 0.76 0.73 0.89 0.76
The sample period of the regressions is from 1996 to 2009, using quarterly Call Report data. 
All specifications are panel regressions with fixed effects for bank organizations and quarterly time dummies (unless otherwise noted).  
The reported R
2 is the within R
2.  All regressions control for District time trends and for the deposit-weighted geographic market 
deposit concentration (annual from Summary of Deposits).  Crisis 1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 2007Q3 to 2008Q2, 
and Crisis 2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 2008Q3 to 2009Q2. 
The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are clustered at the bank organization level.
See Appendix for variable definitions and details about bank panel. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively.
Table 3. The Relationship between the Deposit Interest Rate and Bank Risk Characteristics in the Crisis
(Allowing for Two Phases of the Crisis: 2007Q3-2008Q2 and 2008Q3-2009Q2)
Implicit Rate on Deposits (Call Reports)
Large Bank Indicator
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Crisis1                                 
Liquidity ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                                         
Wholesale fundingt-1
Wholesale fundingt-1  ×  Crisis1
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Crisis2                                 
Unused commitment ratiot-1
Unused commitment ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1
Unused commitment ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2       
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                                       
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                                         
Risk-based capital ratiot-1
Risk-based capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                          
Risk-based capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                          
Wholesale fundingt-1  ×  Crisis2       
NPL to Loanst-1
NPL to Loanst-1  ×  Crisis1                                         
NPL to Loanst-1  ×  Crisis2                                         
Capital ratiot-1
Liquidity ratiot-1
Liquidity ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                                         (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Δ Deposits/         
Assetst-1
Δ Core Deposits/      
Assetst-1
Δ Insured Deposits/ 
Assetst-1
Δ Brokered 
Deposits/         
Assetst-1
TAG Deposits 
(2008Q4)/          
Assetst-1
Liquidity measures
0.040*** 0.028*** 0.018*** 0.009*** 0.189***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.017)
-0.009 -0.008 0.010** 0.006**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
0.022*** 0.012** 0.030*** 0.017***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
-0.088*** -0.062*** -0.028*** -0.008*** 0.047***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010)
0.013*** 0.012*** -0.001 -0.004***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
-0.017*** -0.003 -0.011*** -0.007***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
0.050*** 0.079*** 0.029*** 0.008*** -0.010
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.013)
-0.002 0.018*** 0.009*** 0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
0.008** 0.028*** 0.012*** 0.005***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Solvency measures
-0.194*** -0.139*** -0.098*** -0.045*** 0.054
(0.015) (0.012) (0.009) (0.004) (0.041)
0.008 0.020 0.039*** 0.018*
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010)
0.069*** 0.051*** 0.061*** 0.007
(0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.006)
0.189*** 0.173*** 0.056*** 0.020*** 0.003
(0.018) (0.014) (0.008) (0.005) (0.054)
-0.008 0.017 0.030*** 0.006
(0.020) (0.018) (0.011) (0.005)
0.012 0.015 0.030** 0.028***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.013) (0.006)
-0.007* -0.006 0.0003 0.0000 -0.023
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.029)
0.032** 0.012 0.010* -0.0005
(0.013) (0.011) (0.006) (0.003)
0.052*** 0.036*** 0.021*** -0.005*
(0.015) (0.013) (0.006) (0.003)
-0.006* -0.005** -0.002 -0.001 0.018*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009)
0.010*** 0.003 0.002 -0.0004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
-0.005 0.008** 0.002 -0.006***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 176903 176903 176903 176903 3519
R
2 0.08 0.08 0.34 0.04 0.13
The sample period of the regressions is from 1996 to 2009, using quarterly Call Report data. 
Specifications in columns (1) to (4) are panel regressions with fixed effects for bank organizations.  The reported R
2 is the within R
2.  The specification 
in column (5) is cross-sectional for 2008Q4 when the Transaction Account Guarantee (TAG) was introduced.  Also controlled for in column (5) is the 
share of transaction deposits. Regressions control for District time trends and for the deposit-weighted geographic market deposit concentration
(annual from Summary of Deposits). Crisis 1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 2007Q3 to 2008Q2, and Crisis 2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 
2008Q3 to 2009Q2. The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are clustered at the bank organization level. 
See Appendix for variable definitions and details about bank panel. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively.
Table 4. The Relationship between Deposit Inflows and Bank Risk Characteristics in the Crisis
(Allowing for Two Phases of the Crisis: 2007Q3-2008Q2 and 2008Q3-2009Q2)
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Crisis1                                
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Crisis2                               
Capital ratiot-1
Unused commitment ratiot-1
Unused commitment ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1
Unused commitment ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2       
Large Bank Indicator
Wholesale fundingt-1  ×  Crisis2       
NPL to Loanst-1  ×  Crisis1                                         
NPL to Loanst-1  ×  Crisis2                                         
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                                       
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                                         
Risk-based capital ratiot-1
Risk-based capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                          
Risk-based capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                          
NPL to Loanst-1
Liquidity ratiot-1
Liquidity ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                                        
Liquidity ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                                        
Wholesale fundingt-1
Wholesale fundingt-1  ×  Crisis1(1) (2) (3) (4)
Large Time Rate Deposit Growth 
(insured)
Large Time Rate Large Time Rate












0.026 0.019*** 0.051* 0.074**
(0.025) (0.003) (0.027) (0.032)
0.143*** 0.006 0.147*** 0.151***
(0.030) (0.004) (0.032) (0.032)
-0.165*** 0.030*** -0.130*** -0.133***
(0.035) (0.004) (0.039) (0.039)
-0.043*** -0.028*** -0.079*** -0.117***
(0.016) (0.001) (0.022) (0.033)
0.018 -0.001 0.016 0.048
(0.021) (0.002) (0.022) (0.035)
-0.042* -0.010*** -0.056** -0.020
(0.023) (0.003) (0.024) (0.029)
0.124*** 0.029*** 0.158*** 0.194***
(0.018) (0.002) (0.023) (0.033)
0.032* 0.008*** 0.047** 0.028
(0.019) (0.003) (0.019) (0.034)
-0.058*** 0.009*** -0.045* -0.066**
(0.023) (0.003) (0.023) (0.026)
Solvency measures
0.213*** -0.108*** 0.076 -0.101
(0.061) (0.008) (0.080) (0.135)
-0.133 0.033* -0.090 0.130
(0.116) (0.019) (0.119) (0.189)
0.320*** 0.073*** 0.414*** 0.626***
(0.078) (0.014) (0.087) (0.147)
-0.257** 0.066*** -0.224** -0.136
(0.101) (0.009) (0.113) (0.127)
0.460*** 0.032** 0.573*** 0.557***
(0.087) (0.013) (0.101) (0.119)
0.094 0.013 0.177 0.158
(0.126) (0.014) (0.131) (0.130)
0.029 -0.002 0.026 0.023
(0.054) (0.004) (0.061) (0.066)
-0.201*** 0.008 -0.210*** -0.185***
(0.054) (0.007) (0.057) (0.058)
-0.136 0.024*** -0.123 -0.099
(0.094) (0.006) (0.096) (0.093)
-0.019 -0.002 -0.021 -0.024
(0.032) (0.002) (0.032) (0.033)
-0.046 0.002 -0.044 -0.029
(0.035) (0.002) (0.035) (0.036)
-0.038 0.002 -0.036 -0.018
(0.027) (0.002) (0.027) (0.029)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 176427 176063 176063 176063
R
2 0.76 0.35 0.75 0.72
The sample period of the regressions is from 1996 to 2009, using quarterly Call Report data. 
All specifications are panel regressions with fixed effects for bank organizations and quarterly time dummies.The reported R
2 is the within R
2.  
All regressions control for District time trends and for the deposit-weighted geographic market deposit concentration (annual from 
Summary of Deposits). Crisis 1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 2007Q3 to 2008Q2, and Crisis 2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 
2008Q3 to 2009Q2. The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are clustered at the bank organization level.  
See Appendix for variable definitions and details about bank panel. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively.
Table 5. The Joint Determination of a Bank's Deposit Rates and Flows: An IV Approach
(Allowing for Two Phases of the Crisis: 2007Q3-2008Q2 and 2008Q3-2009Q2)
NPL to Loanst-1
Panel A. Instrumenting for deposit inflows in the interest rate equation (identifying "Bank Supply")
Unused commitment ratiot-1
Unused commitment ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1
Share of failed deposits in a bank's geographic market t
Deposit growth (insured)t
Deposit growth (insured)t  ×  Crisis1
Deposit growth (insured)t  ×  Crisis2       
Unused commitment ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2       
Liquidity ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                                         
Wholesale fundingt-1
Wholesale fundingt-1  ×  Crisis1
Wholesale fundingt-1  ×  Crisis2       
Liquidity ratiot-1
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Crisis2                                      
Capital ratiot-1
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                                       
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                                         
Risk-based capital ratiot-1
Risk-based capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                                     
Risk-based capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                                     
Liquidity ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                                         
NPL to Loanst-1  ×  Crisis1                                         
NPL to Loanst-1  ×  Crisis2                                         
Large Bank Indicator
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Crisis1                                     (1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ Deposits/         
Assetst-1
Large Time Rate Δ Deposits/         
Assetst-1
Δ Deposits/         
Assetst-1












0.032*** -0.123*** 0.035*** 0.033***
(0.004) (0.037) (0.004) (0.004)
-0.008 0.236*** -0.011* -0.007
(0.006) (0.035) (0.006) (0.006)
0.017*** -0.205*** 0.020*** 0.024***
(0.006) (0.042) (0.006) (0.007)
-0.090*** -0.018 -0.090*** -0.090***
(0.002) (0.027) (0.002) (0.002)
0.014*** 0.015 0.010*** 0.012***
(0.004) (0.023) (0.004) (0.004)
-0.018*** 0.052* -0.022*** -0.020***
(0.004) (0.027) (0.004) (0.004)
0.051*** 0.507*** 0.052*** 0.053***
(0.003) (0.030) (0.003) (0.003)
-0.002 -0.135*** -0.003 -0.009**
(0.004) (0.023) (0.004) (0.004)
0.008** -0.217*** 0.006 0.004
(0.004) (0.027) (0.004) (0.004)
Solvency measures
-0.170*** -0.547*** -0.177*** -0.177***
(0.013) (0.089) (0.011) (0.011)
-0.010 0.116 -0.024 -0.010
(0.019) (0.134) (0.023) (0.024)
0.057*** 1.378*** 0.074*** 0.074***
(0.018) (0.111) (0.015) (0.015)
0.195*** -0.385*** 0.230*** 0.229***
(0.018) (0.140) (0.020) (0.020)
-0.007 0.311*** -0.036* -0.048**
(0.019) (0.105) (0.019) (0.020)
0.006 0.045 -0.029 -0.028
(0.020) (0.163) (0.021) (0.021)
-0.008* 0.055 -0.013** -0.013***
(0.004) (0.096) (0.005) (0.005)
0.030** -0.111* 0.049*** 0.057***
(0.013) (0.060) (0.010) (0.010)
0.053*** -0.168 0.075*** 0.076***
(0.016) (0.108) (0.016) (0.016)
-0.007** -0.031 -0.007** -0.007**
(0.003) (0.038) (0.003) (0.003)
0.010*** -0.035 0.011*** 0.014***
(0.003) (0.037) (0.003) (0.004)
-0.004 0.013 -0.004 -0.003
(0.005) (0.032) (0.005) (0.005)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 176903 176063 176063 176063
R
2 0.06 0.43 0.06 0.06
The sample period of the regressions is from 1996 to 2009, using quarterly Call Report data. 
All specifications are panel regressions with fixed effects for bank organizations. The reported R
2 is the within R
2. Because of IV with 
the TED spread, quarterly time dummies are excluded. But District time trends are controlled for, as are dummies for Crisis1 and Crisis2.
Crisis 1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 2007Q3 to 2008Q2, and Crisis 2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 2008Q3 to 2009Q2. 
All regressions also control for the deposit-weighted geographic market deposit concentration (annual from Summary of Deposits). 
The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are clustered at the bank organization level.  
See Appendix for variable definitions and details about bank panel. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively.
Implicit deposit interest rate (large time)t  ×  Crisis1
Implicit deposit interest rate (large time)t  ×  Crisis2      
Unused commitment ratiot-1
Table 5. The Joint Determination of a Bank's Deposit Rates and Flows: An IV Approach
(Allowing for Two Phases of the Crisis: 2007Q3-2008Q2 and 2008Q3-2009Q2)
Panel B. Instrumenting for the deposit rate in the deposit inflows equation (identifying "Depositor Demand")
TED Spreadt
Implicit deposit interest rate (large time))t  
Liquidity ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                                         
Liquidity ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                                         
Wholesale fundingt-1
Unused commitment ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1
Unused commitment ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2       
Liquidity ratiot-1
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Crisis1                                     
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Crisis2                                     
Capital ratiot-1
Wholesale fundingt-1  ×  Crisis1
Wholesale fundingt-1  ×  Crisis2       
Large Bank Indicator
NPL to Loanst-1  ×  Crisis1                                         
NPL to Loanst-1  ×  Crisis2                                         
Risk-based capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                               
Risk-based capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                               
NPL to Loanst-1
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                                       
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                                         

















-0.090*** -0.074** -0.071** -0.024 -0.065** -0.061**











03 2 4 0 663***
HHIt  ×  rt
other
HHIt  ×  rt
other ×  Crisis1       
HHIt  ×  rt
other ×  Crisis2     
Seniors as share of population in a bank's geographic market
Table 6. Industry Equilibrium: The Interdependence between Banks' Deposit Rates
(Allowing for Two Phases of the Crisis: 2007Q3-2008Q2 and 2008Q3-2009Q2)
Average large time deposit rate of other banks (rt
other) 
rt
other ×  Crisis1                                         
rt
other ×  Crisis2                                      
Deposit concentration in a bank's geographic market (HHIt)






Panel A. Large Time Deposit Rate
HHIt  ×  Crisis1














-0.197*** -0.091** -0.201*** -0.086** -0.204*** -0.096***
(0.053) (0.037) (0.047) (0.037) (0.047) (0.037)
0.029 0.106*** 0.023 0.102*** 0.021 0.094***
(0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
-0.126*** -0.110*** -0.122*** -0.106*** -0.122*** -0.107***
(0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 151006 176350 176350 176350 176350 176350
R
2 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76
The sample period of the regressions is from 1996 to 2009, using quarterly Call Report data. 
All specifications are panel regressions with fixed effects for bank organizations.  All specifications control for the bank-level liquidity and 
solvency measures in Table 3 (not shown). The reported R
2 is the within R
2.  Columns (1), (3), and (5) control for quarterly time dummies.  
Columns (2), (4), and (6) exclude quarterly time dummies. In the latter, District time trends are controlled for, as are Crisis1 and Crisis2 dummies.
Crisis 1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 2007Q3 to 2008Q2, and Crisis 2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 2008Q3 to 2009Q2. 
All regressions also control for the deposit-weighted geographic market deposit concentration (annual from Summary of Deposits).
The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are clustered at the bank organization level.  
See Appendix for variable definitions and details about bank panel. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively.
Percentage change in employment in a bank's geographic markett
Percentage change in establishments in a bank's geographic 
markett
Seniort  ×  rt
other
Seniort  ×  rt
other ×  Crisis1       
Seniort  ×  rt
other ×  Crisis2     
Percentage change in house prices in a bank's geographic markett
Seniors as share of population in a banks geographic market 
(Seniort)
Seniort  ×  Crisis1

















0.027 0.029 0.036 0.004 0.037 0.036
























-0.204*** -0.195*** -0.218*** -0.190*** -0.234*** -0.198***
(0.044) (0.031) (0.040) (0.030) (0.040) (0.031)
-0.018 0.081*** -0.018 0.083*** -0.019 0.079***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
-0.028* -0.014 -0.039** -0.016 -0.038** -0.014
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 151002 176382 176382 176382 176382 176382
R
2 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
The sample period of the regressions is from 1996 to 2009, using quarterly Call Report data. 
All specifications are panel regressions with fixed effects for bank organizations.  All specifications control for the bank-level liquidity and 
solvency measures in Table 3 (not shown). The reported R
2 is the within R
2.  Columns (1), (3), and (5) control for quarterly time dummies.  
Columns (2), (4), and (6) exclude quarterly time dummies. In the latter, District time trends are controlled for, as are Crisis1 and Crisis2 dummies.
Crisis 1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 2007Q3 to 2008Q2, and Crisis 2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 2008Q3 to 2009Q2. 
All regressions also control for the deposit-weighted geographic market deposit concentration (annual from Summary of Deposits).
The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are clustered at the bank organization level.  
See Appendix for variable definitions and details about bank panel. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively.
Percentage change in house prices in a bank's geographic markett
Percentage change in employment in a bank's geographic markett
Percentage change in establishments in a bank's geographic 
markett
(Fail-share)t+2
Table 6. Industry Equilibrium: The Interdependence between Banks' Deposit Rates
(Allowing for Two Phases of the Crisis: 2007Q3-2008Q2 and 2008Q3-2009Q2)
Share of failed deposits in a bank's geographic market (Fail-
share)t
(Fail-share)t+1
Panel B. Core Deposit Rate




Average core deposit rate of other banks (rt
other) 
rt
other ×  Crisis1                                         
rt
other ×  Crisis2                                      
Deposit concentration in a bank's geographic market (HHIt)
HHIt  ×  Crisis1
HHIt  ×  Crisis2
HHIt  ×  rt
other
HHIt  ×  rt
other ×  Crisis1       
HHIt  ×  rt
other ×  Crisis2     
Seniort  ×  Crisis1
Seniort  ×  Crisis2
Seniort  ×  rt
other
Seniort  ×  rt
other ×  Crisis1       
Seniort  ×  rt
other ×  Crisis2     Previous 5 years 
to crisis
Fall 1998  Previous 5 years 
to crisis
July 4 2007 - 







(last 2 weeks of 
September 2008)
Oct 8 2008 -     
July 1 2009
Liabilities
0.060 0.194 0.095 0.071 0.952 0.085
0.042 0.173 0.077 0.051 0.564 0.115
0.033 0.149 0.026 0.038 0.448 -0.063
0.021 0.103 0.026 0.029 0.405 -0.067
Assets
0.095 0.181 0.112 0.103 0.564 -0.049
0.027 0.048 0.010 0.033 0.159 -0.024
0.017 0.170 0.032 0.028 0.632 0.083
The sample is weekly reporters in the Federal Reserve H8 Release for all domestically chartered banks (exclude the branches and agencies 
of foreign banks). The weekly growth rates are defined as the weekly change in the variable divided by total assets in the previous week, and  
then averages are taken within the different time periods shown (1993-1998 and 2002-2009).  Note that the H8 Release reports total loans as 
"loans and leases in bank credit"; core deposits are reported as "other deposits" where total deposits are the sum of "other deposits" and 
"large-time deposits"; and we take liquid assets as the sum of cash assets, securities, and interbank loans extended.
Other borrowings
of which, Other borrowings 
not from banks in U.S. 
Loans
of which, C&I loans
Liquid assets
of which, Core deposits
Table 7. Average Weekly Funding and Asset Growth
(All Domestically Chartered Banks, in %)
1998 LTCM Crisis 2007-2009 Financial Crisis
Deposits




1990-2009 1990-2009 Gatev and 
Strahan sample 
1991-2000
1990-2009 1990-2009 Large Time Core
-0.021*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.087*** 0.110*** 0.113*** -0.434*** -0.323***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.040) (0.029)
Unused commitment ratiot-1  ×  Stress                       0.041*** 0.007 0.022*** 0.047*** 0.004 0.032*** 0.137* -0.147***
(0.011) (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.005) (0.009) (0.070) (0.049)
Unused commitment ratiot-1  ×  Stress  ×  Crisis1             -0.039** -0.020 0.250** 0.513***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.110) (0.082)
Unused commitment ratiot-1  ×  Stress  ×  Crisis2             0.018 -0.023* 0.025 0.167***
(0.013) 0.013 (0.085) (0.059)
Unused commitment ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                          0.004 -0.004 -0.049 -0.260***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.077) (0.053)
Unused commitment ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                          -0.011 -0.021*** 0.042 -0.037
(0.007) (0.006) (0.042) (0.032)
0.144*** 0.119*** 0.122*** 0.064*** 0.059*** 0.061*** -0.365*** -0.232***
(0.025) (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010) (0.085) (0.072)
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Stress                                                       0.007 0.017 -0.001 -0.002 -0.030*** -0.045*** 0.194 -0.343**
(0.020) (0.010) (0.014) (0.024) (0.012) (0.016) (0.162) (0.136)
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Stress  ×  Crisis1                                       0.026 0.074 0.271 -0.053
(0.034) (0.048) (0.298) (0.191)
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Stress  ×  Crisis2                                       0.002 -0.012 -0.201 0.410***
(0 023) (0 027) (0 181) (0 142)
Δ Deposits/Assetst-1 Δ Loans/Assetst-1 Rates
Table 8. The Relationship between Market Stress and Growth in Deposits and Loans:
Was it Different in the 2007-2009 Crisis? Revisiting Gatev and Strahan (2006)
Unused commitment ratiot-1
Capital ratiot-1
(0.023) (0.027) (0.181) (0.142)
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                                                      0.003 -0.043 -0.175 0.106
(0.024) (0.034) (0.191) 0.114
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                                                      0.046*** 0.058*** -0.146 -0.220***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.098) (0.064)
-0.002 -0.004* -0.002 0.006 -0.003 -0.003 0.013 0.014
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.037) (0.035)
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Stress                                          0.002 0.006* -0.001 -0.013** 0.010*** 0.010** -0.180** -0.028
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.081) (0.033)
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Stress  ×  Crisis1                            0.031*** 0.017* 0.250*** -0.002
(0.012) (0.009) (0.081) (0.037)
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Stress  ×  Crisis2                            0.008 -0.020*** 0.136* -0.010
(0.012) (0.007) (0.075) (0.039)
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Crisis1                                           -0.013 -0.009 -0.131*** -0.044*
(0.009) (0.007) (0.048) (0.026)
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Crisis2                                            -0.009 0.014*** -0.054* 0.004
(0.006) (0.004) (0.033) (0.016)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 114323 252526 252526 114323 252526 252526 235491 235532
R
2 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.73 0.91
The sample period of the regressions is from 1990 to 2009, except for the Gatev and Strahan sample period (1991-2000).  The data are from the quarterly Call Reports. 
All specifications are panel regressions with fixed effects for bank organizations and quarterly time dummies.  The reported R
2 is the within R
2.  
Crisis 1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 2007Q3 to 2008Q2, and Crisis 2 is a dummy equal to 1 from 2008Q3 to 2009Q2.  Following Gatev and Strahan, the interaction of 
the 3 month Treasury bill rate with unused commitment ratio is also controlled for.  The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are clustered at the bank organization level.
See Appendix for variable definitions and details about bank panel. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively.
Large Bank Indicator (Top 25 by asset size)Appendix. Variable Definitions
Dependent variables (Call Reports)
Bank panel data are from the quarterly Reports of Condition and Income, (FFIEC 031 for banks with domestic and foreign offices; FFIEC 041 
for banks with domestic offices only).  Banks are aggregated to top holder level (RSSD9348). Bank organizations with assets less than $100 million
are excluded, as are non-U.S. domiciled banking organizations. As a merger control, bank organizations with asset growth greater than 10%
during a quarter are excluded in that quarter.  Growth rates are defined as the quarterly change in the variable divided by beginning of period 
assets (RCFD2170). Growth rates are also winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the effect of outliers.
Interest rate, large time deposits (implicit) Interest expense on large time deposits: RIADA517 (RIAD4174 before 1997Q1), divided by quarterly average of large time deposits: 
RCONA514 (RCON3345 before 1997Q1).
Interest rate, core deposits (implicit) Interest expense on core deposits: RIAD4508 + RIAD0093 (RIAD4509 + RIAD4511 before 2001Q1) + RIADA518 (RIAD4512 before 1997Q1),
divided by quarterly average of core deposits: RCON3485 + RCONB563 (RCON3486 + RCON3487 before 2001Q1) + 
RCONA529 (RCON3469 before 1997Q1).
Quarterly growth in deposits Deposits: RCFD2200.
Quarterly growth in core deposits  Core deposits are the sum of transaction deposits, saving deposits, and time deposits less than $100,000: 
RCON2215 + RCON6810 + RCON0352 + RCON6648.
Quarterly growth in insured deposits Insured deposits are accounts of $100,000 or less (include retirement accounts of $250,000 or less after 2006Q2).  Note that from 2009Q3, 
reporting thresholds on non-retirement deposits increased from $100,000 to $250,000. 
Insured deposits: RCON2702 (before 2006Q2); RCONF049 + RCONF045 (from 2006Q2).
Quarterly growth in brokered deposits Brokered Deposits (received from brokers or dealers): RCON2365.
Transaction account guarantee program  Non-interest bearing transaction accounts of more than $250,000 for banks participating in the FDIC transaction account program (RCONG167).  
deposit share (2008Q4) The share at the start of the program (2008Q4) is defined as a share of beginning of period assets.
Quarterly growth in loans Loans: RCFD1400.
Dependent variables (Bank Rate Monitor 1997-2009)
A weekly bank (and thrift) panel data set of current checking and CD rates based on a weekly survey of branches of financial institutions carried out
by Bank Rate Monitor (data are proprietary). The panel is unbalanced with 1250 bank-branch cross-sectional observations on average over the period
9/19/1997 - 12/25/2009.  This set corresponds to 358 banks and 214 banking organizations on average, respectively (these are a small subset of banks
filing Call Reports, which are over 6000 organizations on average).  The data are aggregated to top holder by taking the average rate within a
banking organization (after cleaning the data for duplicates and missing observations).  For branch-level analysis, each branch is matched to the
relevant geographic area in the Summary of Deposits.
Interest checking rate Reported rate on interest checking account.
CD 12 month rate Reported rate on 12 month CD.
CD 24 month rate Reported rate on 24 month CD.
CD 60 month rate Reported rate on 60 month CD.
Covariates
Bank failure indicator Indicator equal to 1 in the quarter corresponding to a bank failure, and 0 otherwise.  Failure can be regulatory-assisted (denoted 'formal' fail in Table 2)
near-fail based on market equity data (denoted CRSP fail in Table 2), or both. In total based on Call Report sample, there are 517 formal fails 
and 91 near-fails (of which 16 result in formal fail later).  Specifically, regulatory-assisted failure is if RSSD9061 = 4 or 5. And cross-checked/merged
with FDIC's failed bank list as of 4/16/2010. Regulatory failure is at the bank level. Indicator assigned to top holder if failed bank asset share at time 
of failure was over 10% of holding company assets.  CRSP near-fails are the period first associated with market equity returns worse than -90%
over an 18-month period(Acharya et al, 2010). The CRSP data are matched to bank identifiers using the CRSP-FRB link:
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html
Unused commitment ratio Unused commitments divided by the sum of unused commitments and loans.  Unused commitments are: 
RCFD3814 + RCFD3816 + RCFD3817 + RCFD3818 + RCFD6550 + RCFD3411.
Liquidity ratio (liquid assets to assets,  Liquid assets are cash, federal funds sold & reverse repos, and securities excluding MBS/ABS securities:
excludes MBS/ABS) Cash: RCFD0010; Federal funds sold: RCFD1350 (before 2002Q1) and RCONB987 + RCFDB989 (from 2002Q1).
Securities excl. MBS/ABS before 2009Q2: RCFD1754+RCFD1773 - (RCFD8500+RCFD8504+RCFDC026+RCFD8503+RCFD8507+RCFDC027). 
And from 2009Q2: RCFD1754 + RCFD1773 - (RCFDG300 + RCFDG304 + RCFDG308 + RCFDG312 + RCFDG316 + RCFDG320 +
RCFDG324 + RCFDG328 + RCFDC026 + RCFDG336 +RCFDG340 + RCFDG344 + RCFDG303 + RCFDG307 + RCFDG311 +
 RCFDG315 + RCFDG319 + RCFDG323 + RCFDG327 + RCFDG331 + RCFDC027 + RCFDG339 + RCFDG343 + RCFDG347).
Wholesale funding to asset ratio Wholesale funds (also known as managed liabilities in the Federal Reserve Bulletin) are the sum of: large-time deposits, deposits booked in 
foreign offices, subordinated debt and debentures, gross federal funds purchased, repos, and other borrowed money: 
RCON2604 + RCFN2200 + RCFD3200 + RCFD2800 (RCONB993+RCFDB995 from 2002q1) + RCFD3190.
Nonperforming loans to loans  Loans past due 90 days or more and nonaccruals: RCFD1407 + RCFD1403.
Capital ratio (book capital to assets) Book capital to asset ratio.  Capital: RCFD3210.
Risk-based capital ratio Total risk-based capital ratio defined RCFD3792/RCFDA223, where RCFD3792 is total risk-based capital and RCFDA223 are total 
risk-weighted assets (available only since 1996Q1) 
Indicator for Large Banks Indicator equal to one for the largest 25 commercial banking organizations by asset size (time-varying).
Real Estate Loan Share Loans secured by real estate (RCFD1410) divided by total loans. 
Residential Mortgages Sold Closed-end 1-4 family residential mortgages sold in the quarter, including first and junior liens: RCFDF070 + RCFDF071, divided by assets.
Volatility of daily equity returns (quarterly) The standard deviation of market-adjusted daily returns, where both bank and market returns incorporate dividends. The market return is 
the SNL bank index. Daily return data are from CRSP.
Equity Return (quarterly, market-adjusted) Return on equity, calculated based on end of quarter and beginning of quarter market prices, and adjusted for market return.
Quasi market capital to asset ratio  Defined as: Market equity/(Book assets - Book equity + Market equity), where market equity equals Shares outstanding*Price end of quarter.  
(end quarter) Book assets and book equity are from Call Reports, where book assets are RCFD2170 and book equity is total equity capital (RCFD3210) 
minus the book value of preferred stock and related surplus (RCFD3838).
Share of large-time deposits maturing in 1 year  Large-time deposits with a remaining maturity or next repricing date of 3 months or less and 3-12 months: RCONA584 + RCONA585, 
divided by total large-time deposits (RCON2604).
Geographic market deposit concentration (HHI)The branch deposit-weighted geographic market deposit concentration (annual from the FDIC's Summary of Deposits (SOD)).
The geographic market is defined as the MSA (CBSA_METROB) if urban or the county (STCNTYBR) if rural.
Geographic market share of failed deposits  The share of deposits belonging to failed banks and thrifts in a bank's geographic market (branch deposit weighted). See above details on 
Summary of Deposits and the failed financial institution information above (latter is merged into SOD).
Geographic market senior share  Seniors (65 and over) as a share of population in bank's geographic market (branch deposit-weighted). Data from 2000 census matched to SOD areas)
Geographic market % change house prices  Quarterly percentage change in housing price index (all-transaction) in a bank's geographic market (branch deposit-weighted). Source: FHFA.
Geographic market % change in employment  Change in total private employment, log differences, year-on-year, in a bank's geographic market (branch deposit-weighted). Source: QCEW.
Geographic market % change in establishments Change in total private establishments, log differences, year on year, in a bank's geographic market (branch deposit-weighted). Source: QCEW.
District time trends Regional time trends based on the Federal Reserve district the main bank in a banking organization is located (RSSD9170).
Aggregate characteristics
Commercial paper spread (%) The CP spread is the 3 month commercial paper rate for high grade nonfinancial borrowers - 3 month T-bill rate.(Federal Reserve H.15 release)







Dependent variables (Call Reports)
Interest rate, large time deposits (implicit, in %) 1.132 0.393 0.836 1.142 1.385 238557
Interest rate, core deposits (implicit, in %) 0.852 0.361 0.566 0.849 1.074 238543
Quarterly growth in deposits 0.011 0.031 -0.006 0.008 0.028 253492
Quarterly growth in core deposits 0.008 0.028 -0.006 0.006 0.023 253492
Quarterly growth in insured deposits 0.007 0.029 -0.005 0.003 0.015 244002
Quarterly growth in brokered deposits 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 236763
Transaction account guarantee program deposit share (2008Q4) 0.033 0.045 0.004 0.021 0.044 21674
Quarterly growth in loans 0.010 0.029 -0.003 0.010 0.025 253492
Dependent variables (Bank Rate Monitor 1997-2009)
Interest checking rate (%) 0.610 0.601 0.150 0.400 1.000 107466
CD 12 month rate (%) 3.170 1.540 1.740 3.200 4.500 107298
CD 24 month rate (%) 3.448 1.412 2.230 3.444 4.640 104874
CD 60 month rate (%) 4.023 1.153 3.200 4.020 4.890 97235
Covariates
Regulatory-assisted failure dummy (formal fail) 0.0009 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 258108
Market-equity < -90% failure dummy (CRSP near-fail) 0.0003 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 258108
All fail dummy (formal and near-fails) 0.0012 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.000 258108
Unused commitment ratio 0.127 0.087 0.070 0.117 0.170 257078
Liquidity ratio (excludes MBS/ABS) 0.242 0.144 0.141 0.218 0.312 215100
Wholesale funding ratio 0.198 0.144 0.103 0.171 0.255 258108
Nonperforming loans to loans 0.012 0.020 0.002 0.007 0.014 228042
Capital ratio (book capital to assets) 0.091 0.045 0.076 0.089 0.106 258108
Risk-based capital ratio 0.159 0.101 0.117 0.137 0.173 182675
Indicator for Large Banks 0.007 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.000 258108
Real Estate Loan Share 0.642 0.235 0.527 0.682 0.809 257015
Residential Mortgages Sold (normalized by assets) 0.008 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.000 52964
Volatility of daily equity returns (quarterly) 0.027 0.022 0.015 0.022 0.031 28528
Equity Return (quarterly, market-adjusted) -0.002 0.333 -0.085 -0.005 0.078 28528
Quasi market capital to asset ratio (end of quarter) 0.138 0.074 0.095 0.132 0.171 28544
Share of large-time deposits maturing in 1 year or less 0.756 0.215 0.678 0.810 0.902 175410
Geographic market deposit concentration (HHI, branch deposit-weighted) 0.175 0.108 0.102 0.148 0.213 200761
Geographic market share of failed deposits (branch deposit-weighted) 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 200761
Geographic market senior share (branch deposit-weighted) 0.133 0.031 0.112 0.129 0.150 200761
Geographic market percentage change in house prices (branch deposit-weighted) 0.009 0.017 0.003 0.010 0.017 198192
Geographic market percentage change in employment (branch deposit-weighted) 0.002 0.036 -0.013 0.007 0.022 180754
Geographic market percentage change in establishments (branch deposit-weighted 0.011 0.027 -0.002 0.011 0.025 180795
Aggregate characteristics
Commercial paper spread (%) 0.37 0.23 0.20 0.37 0.47 80
TED spread (%) 0.58 0.37 0.32 0.52 0.68 80
Source: Call Reports, National Information Center, FDIC, Bank Rate Monitor, Summary of Deposits, CRSP, SNL Financial, HAVER Analytics, 
Federal Reserve H.15 release, 2000 Census, Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages.
Note: Summary statistics are calculated over the regression sample (thus exclude mergers, non-U.S. domiciled banking organizations, and those 
below $100 million in total assets). See Appendix for variable definitions.
Table A1. Summary statistics for regression bank panel 1990Q1-2009Q4This table shows the aggregate balance sheet of large banks and small banks, respectively.  The second column reports the balance sheet item as a share of total assets in 2007Q2 (in %), and the 
following columns report the evolution over 2007Q3 to 2009Q4.  For each balance sheet item, we report two figures (both in %).  The first is the cumulative change of the balance sheet item normalized 
by 2007Q2 total assets (Xt - X2007Q2)/Total Asset2007Q2.  The second row (in gray itallics) is the cumulative percent change of the balance sheet item from its level in 2007Q2 (lnXt - lnX2007Q2).





2007Q2 2007Q3 2007Q4 2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4 2009Q4
Assets
Cash 0.1 4.3 -0.1 0.3 0.5 0.6 2.7 5.7 5.3 3.9 4.6 4.6 7.6
3.6 -2.8 6.6 11.9 13.2 48.2 84.1 80.1 64.6 72.8 73.2
Securities 0.3 12.3 0.1 0.0 0.5 1.3 2.3 2.3 3.8 5.3 5.8 7.1 16.5
1.8 1.1 0.2 3.8 10.0 16.8 17.2 26.9 35.8 38.8 45.3
MBS and ABS 0.2 9.2 0.0 0.2 1.0 1.6 2.6 2.0 2.4 3.5 3.4 3.9 11.2
2.4 0.1 2.5 10.2 16.1 24.8 19.8 23.3 32.1 31.2 35.1
Fed Funds and Repos 0.2 5.4 0.4 1.2 1.9 1.8 2.1 2.3 1.3 0.6 -0.1 -0.9 3.8
3.7 7.6 20.9 30.1 28.8 32.5 36.4 21.3 10.4 -1.1 -19.0
Trading Assets 0.5 11.0 1.0 1.8 3.1 1.9 2.0 2.4 0.3 -0.5 0.5 0.0 9.3
5.2 8.8 15.0 25.2 16.2 17.0 20.0 2.8 -4.4 4.7 -0.1
Total Loans 1.5 49.1 2.2 5.1 5.6 5.2 8.0 6.8 5.6 5.7 4.1 3.8 45.1
3.0 4.4 9.8 10.8 10.1 15.0 12.9 10.9 10.9 8.0 7.5
Real estate 0.9 25.0 0.4 1.8 1.8 1.2 3.4 3.2 3.0 3.7 2.9 3.4 24.3
3.7 1.4 6.9 6.8 4.8 12.7 11.9 11.4 13.6 11.1 12.9
C&I 0.4 10.3 0.9 1.6 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.0 1.6 1.0 0.1 -0.8 8.1
4.3 8.6 14.5 18.1 17.9 19.4 18.1 14.9 8.9 0.8 -7.6
Other loans 0.1 13.8 0.9 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.4 1.6 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 12.7
0.9 6.6 11.5 12.3 13.4 15.9 10.8 6.8 7.5 7.6 8.1
Total Assets 3.2 100.0 4.8 10.8 14.7 13.5 19.6 20.8 17.0 16.1 16.6 16.0
Liabilities
Deposits 1.7 56.5 2.5 6.6 8.2 7.8 11.6 14.4 12.9 14.2 15.8 17.3 62.9
of which: 3.0 4.3 11.0 13.6 12.9 18.7 22.7 20.6 22.4 24.6 26.7
Insured deposits
(a) 0.4 17.2 0.1 0.8 1.7 1.7 3.9 4.6 5.6 5.4 11.2 12.0 24.9
2.1 0.7 4.7 9.5 9.3 20.4 23.8 28.2 27.4 50.0 52.9
Core deposits
(b) 0.6 32.3 0.2 2.4 3.8 3.4 6.3 9.7 10.8 11.8 12.4 14.7 40.0
1.6 0.6 7.1 11.1 9.9 17.8 26.3 28.9 31.1 32.6 37.4
Uninsured deposits
(a) 1.3 39.3 2.4 5.7 6.5 6.1 7.7 9.7 7.3 8.8 4.6 5.3 38.0
3.4 5.8 13.6 15.3 14.5 18.0 22.1 17.0 20.2 11.1 12.6
Large time deposits 0.1 5.9 0.6 1.5 1.8 1.3 2.8 2.0 1.2 0.8 0.2 -0.2 4.9
1.1 9.7 23.2 26.9 20.5 39.2 29.6 18.7 12.1 4.1 -3.5
Fed Funds and Repos 0.3 7.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.6 0.8 1.4 0.6 0.5 0.3 -0.1 -2.1 4.5
3.4 -3.3 -1.0 8.4 10.0 17.4 8.0 6.4 4.5 -2.0 -33.2
Trading Liabilities 0.1 4.5 0.5 0.6 1.2 0.7 0.5 1.8 0.5 -0.6 -0.1 -0.6 3.3
1.7 10.3 11.8 24.0 15.1 11.3 34.5 9.9 -14.3 -3.3 -15.5
Other borrowing 0.4 9.0 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.8 3.8 3.1 2.2 0.6 -0.9 -0.4 7.4
4.7 14.3 15.3 17.9 18.0 34.7 29.6 21.5 5.9 -10.3 -4.1
of which: FHLB Advances 0.2 2.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 2.3 1.5 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.5 2.6
7.5 24.9 27.3 31.3 29.8 64.3 47.2 32.0 30.9 16.4 19.1
of which: Other (incl. Federal Reserve) 0.2 6.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.5 1.6 1.2 -0.4 -1.3 -0.9 4.8
3.7 9.9 10.1 12.1 13.0 20.3 21.8 17.1 -5.8 -23.0 -14.8
Subordinated Debt 0.1 1.8 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 1.5
5.4 3.8 9.0 8.8 8.4 8.3 13.9 6.4 4.6 0.4 -3.4
Capital 0.3 10.6 0.6 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.6 2.5 3.0 3.5 3.9 12.4
3.0 5.5 11.3 13.0 13.3 14.5 14.4 21.2 24.8 28.1 31.2
Note: 
(a)  There is a break in the insured deposit series in 2009Q3 when banks were asked to report accounts under $250,000 (the previous account limit reported was under $100,000).
(b) Core deposits are defined as the sum of transaction deposits, savings deposits (including MMDAs), and time deposits of less than $100,000.  
Both core and large time deposits are components of domestic deposits.  The remaining component of total deposits are foreign deposits.
Table A2.  Aggregate Balance Sheet for Banks During the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis










2007Q2 2007Q3 2007Q4 2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4 2009Q4
Assets
Cash -0.1 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.2 6.6 5.5 4.3 6.7 7.9 11.1
-2.1 1.4 0.2 3.4 8.4 29.9 108.3 96.1 82.1 109.2 120.6
Securities -0.1 16.1 0.0 -0.2 -1.1 -1.2 -1.5 -0.9 -0.6 -0.9 -0.4 -0.4 15.4
-0.4 -0.1 -1.4 -6.9 -8.0 -9.9 -5.9 -4.0 -5.4 -2.2 -2.8
MBS and ABS -0.1 6.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 6.3
-1.3 -5.8 -6.9 -8.4 -7.1 -6.2 -3.2 -1.0 0.5 3.8 4.8
Fed Funds and Repos 0.3 6.6 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -1.3 -4.0 -5.3 -5.3 -5.5 -5.7 -5.7 0.8
5.3 0.3 0.2 -6.7 -22.4 -93.5 -167.9 -164.3 -182.7 -203.7 -206.4
Trading Assets 0.3 5.5 -0.1 0.0 0.9 0.2 -0.1 0.3 -0.2 -1.2 -1.4 -2.2 3.2
5.7 -1.3 -0.8 15.4 4.1 -2.4 5.9 -4.6 -24.9 -30.0 -50.6
Total Loans 0.8 51.7 1.6 2.4 2.6 3.3 4.7 5.1 4.0 3.1 1.5 0.8 51.3
1.5 3.0 4.5 4.9 6.3 8.7 9.4 7.5 5.8 2.8 1.4
Real estate 0.4 30.2 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.3 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.0 1.3 1.0 30.6
1.2 1.3 1.9 2.3 4.3 5.8 5.8 7.1 6.5 4.1 3.3
C&I 0.3 11.9 0.8 1.3 1.4 1.7 2.3 2.7 1.9 1.3 0.7 0.6 12.2
2.2 6.7 10.4 10.9 13.5 17.8 20.7 14.8 10.3 5.5 4.8
Other loans 0.2 9.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.6 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.8 8.6
1.7 3.9 5.2 5.0 3.1 5.7 6.0 -0.6 -2.2 -4.8 -9.2
Total Assets 2.1 100.0 1.5 3.0 4.4 4.2 4.7 5.2 3.5 2.3 2.8 2.0
Liabilities
Deposits 0.3 48.7 -0.6 -1.0 -1.0 -0.9 -0.3 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.2 2.0 49.7
0.6 -1.2 -2.1 -2.0 -1.9 -0.6 1.5 2.0 2.2 2.4 4.0
Insured deposits
(a) 0.3 24.6 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.0 2.3 3.0 2.0 1.9 10.1 10.0 33.9
1.0 0.1 0.0 3.0 4.0 9.0 11.3 7.8 7.4 34.3 34.3
Core deposits
(b) 0.2 39.2 -0.4 -0.7 -0.7 -0.5 0.0 0.9 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.9 40.2
0.5 -1.0 -1.7 -1.9 -1.4 0.1 2.1 1.3 1.8 2.5 4.8
Uninsured deposits
(a) 0.0 24.1 -0.6 -1.0 -2.0 -1.9 -2.6 -2.2 -1.0 -0.8 -8.8 -8.0 15.7
0.1 -2.6 -4.3 -8.5 -8.3 -11.4 -9.7 -4.4 -3.4 -45.7 -40.6
Large time deposits 1.0 24.4 1.7 2.4 3.4 3.8 2.7 -0.2 -0.1 1.3 2.4 3.6 27.4
4.1 6.8 9.6 13.0 14.4 10.7 -0.7 -0.3 5.2 9.4 13.7
Fed Funds and Repos 0.3 8.8 -0.5 -0.7 -0.4 -1.0 -2.0 -3.8 -3.4 -2.8 -2.8 -3.2 5.5
3.1 -6.0 -7.8 -4.2 -12.4 -25.6 -56.4 -48.8 -38.7 -38.5 -45.5
Trading Liabilities 0.1 2.3 -0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 -0.2 0.9 0.5 -0.2 0.1 -0.4 1.9
4.5 -5.0 0.2 13.2 -1.8 -7.4 34.1 18.2 -8.8 2.2 -19.3
Other borrowing 0.2 9.2 0.3 1.6 2.5 3.5 3.9 6.1 5.6 4.1 2.7 0.9 9.9
2.2 2.9 15.7 23.7 32.3 35.7 50.9 47.6 36.7 25.3 8.9
of which: FHLB Advances 0.0 3.3 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.2 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.2 3.4
0.4 11.6 21.2 26.1 32.7 39.0 31.6 20.1 15.2 9.4 5.8
of which: Other (incl. Federal Reserve) 0.0 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 1.1
1.2 4.8 12.8 9.6 22.6 16.0 26.0 28.8 21.0 12.5 8.6
Subordinated Debt 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.2
-2.5 1.4 -1.1 -0.6 -0.4 2.2 -2.6 -17.3 -18.4 -25.0 -13.0
Capital 0.1 6.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 6.8
1.1 1.0 -0.4 0.2 -0.9 -0.5 -1.5 -2.0 -1.1 1.0 0.1
Note: 
(a)  There is a break in the insured deposit series in 2009Q3 when banks were asked to report accounts under $250,000 (the previous account limit reported was under $100,000).
(b) Core deposits are defined as the sum of transaction deposits, savings deposits (including MMDAs), and time deposits of less than $100,000.





Panel B. Small Banks (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
24 month CD 60 month CD 24 month CD 60 month CD 24 month CD 60 month CD 24 month CD 60 month CD
Liquidity measures
-0.067 0.107 0.202 -0.161 -0.230 -0.042 0.059 -0.094
(0.337) (0.421) (0.403) (0.415) (0.352) (0.442) (0.404) (0.386)
0.891* 1.761** -0.436 1.028 0.617** 0.540 0.368 -0.117
(0.472) (0.690) (0.621) (0.715) (0.299) (0.340) (0.298) (0.452)
0.396 0.518 -0.169 -0.262 0.414 0.547* -0.266 -0.457
(0.265) (0.300) (0.272) (0.344) (0.258) (0.311) (0.288) (0.365)
-0.374 -1.163** -0.231 -0.473 -0.029 -0.175 0.373 0.530*
(0.335) (0.470) (0.346) (0.463) (0.286) (0.289) (0.253) (0.279)
-0.113 0.094 0.047 -0.176 0.047 0.260 0.095 -0.186
(0.266) (0.325) (0.250) (0.270) (0.270) (0.307) (0.253) (0.275)
-0.150 -0.946 0.694 0.406 -0.439* -0.471 0.107 0.205
(0.446) (0.618) (0.466) (0.521) (0.264) (0.325) (0.233) (0.331)
Solvency measures
-5.596* -7.980** 16.896 69.661 -7.300** -12.055*** 39.127 83.262
(3.307) (3.514) (50.070) (54.543) (3.560) (3.784) (66.654) (68.388)
19.813*** 18.818* 11.891 5.370 8.929** 18.003*** -54.679 -26.762
(4 268) (9 902) (98 681) (123 245) (3 766) (6 534) (91 432) (90 795)
Table A3.  The Relationship between Offered Deposit Rates and Bank Risk Characteristics: An Alternative Data Set 
(Weekly, Bank Rate Monitor (BRM): September 1997 - December 2009)
Stress Proxy = Dummy from Bear Stearns failure to Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act (March 14, 2008 - October 3, 2008)
Stress Proxy = Commercial Paper Spread (weekly)
High NPL Low NPL High NPL Low NPL
Banks covered by the BRM survey are a small share of all banks filing Call Reports
Unused commitment ratiot-1
Unused commitment ratiot-1  ×  Stress Proxy
NPL to Loanst-1
NPL to Loanst-1  ×  Stress Proxy                         
Liquidity ratiot-1
Liquidity ratiot-1  ×  Stress Proxy                              
Wholesale fundingt-1
Wholesale fundingt-1  ×  Stress Proxy                       
(4.268) (9.902) (98.681) (123.245) (3.766) (6.534) (91.432) (90.795)
2.369* 1.921 -3.000 -4.777*** 2.023 1.041 -3.490** -5.471***
(1.371) (1.745) (1.409) (1.578) (1.274) (1.966) (1.483) (1.744)
0.903 1.147 2.066 0.437 1.380 2.911 1.199 1.675
(1.694) (2.269) (2.379) (2.365) (1.389) (2.103) (1.049) (1.772)
-1.256 -1.453 2.198*** 1.363* -0.996 -1.076 2.367*** 1.803**
(1.115) (1.005) (0.721) (0.749) (1.120) (1.084) (0.691) (0.726)
1.444 1.758 0.372 1.713 -0.972 -1.023 -0.162 -0.951
(1.216) (1.624) (1.001) (1.243) (1.237) (1.169) (0.579) (0.910)
-0.005 0.023 0.146 0.277 0.048 0.067 0.292 0.376**
(0.092) (0.209) (0.202) (0.129) (0.087) (0.211) (0.240) (0.147)
-0.247** -0.096 0.430 0.631 -0.183*** -0.154* -0.330 -0.134
(0.110) (0.180) (0.282) (0.265) (0.070) (0.081) (0.213) (0.148)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 51804 48393 51405 47326 51804 48393 51405 47326
R
2 0.92 0.85 0.87 0.77 0.92 0.85 0.87 0.77
The sample period of the regressions is from 1997 to 2009, using weekly Bank Rate Monitor data for the dependent variables.
All specifications are panel regressions with fixed effects for bank organizations and weekly time dummies.  The reported R
2 is the within R
2.  
All regressions control for the deposit-weighted geographic market deposit concentration (annual from Summary of Deposits).
Note that bank liquidity and solvency characteristics are from the quarterly Call Reports, and therefore t-1 indicates the one quarter lag.
High nonperforming loan subset are those banks with a ratio of nonperforming loans (90 plus days) to loans above the median.
The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are clustered at the bank organization level.
See Appendix for variable definitions and details about bank panel. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively.
Large Bank Indicator
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Stress Proxy           
Capital ratiot-1
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Stress Proxy
Risk-based capital ratiot-1  ×  Stress Proxy







-0.131*** -0.120*** -0.139*** -0.071 -0.158*** -0.130***
















-0.205 -0.140 -0.282 -0.139 -0.263 -0.117
(0.331) (0.353) (0.355) (0.355) (0.361) (0.359)
-0.212 -0.576 -0.215 -0.578 -0.215 -0.617
(0.219) (0.420) (0.220) (0.419) (0.233) (0.426)
0.370* 0.116 0.381* 0.119 0.314 0.112
(0.215) (0.328) (0.209) (0.331) (0.210) (0.320)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 470986 470986 470986 470986 470986 470986
R
2 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.91
The sample period of the regressions is from 1997 to 2009, using weekly Bank Rate Monitor branch-level data for the dependent variables.
All specifications include fixed effects for bank organizations, and control for the bank-level liquidity and solvency measures (not shown).
Columns (1), (3), and (5) control for weekly time dummies. Columns (2), (4), and (6) exclude weekly time dummies. In the latter regressions, 
the Stress period dummy is controlled for. The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are clustered at the bank organization level.  
See Appendix for variable definitions and details about bank panel. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively.
Percentage change in house prices in a bank branch's 
geographic markett
Percentage change in employment in a bank branch's 
geographic markett
Percentage change in establishments in a bank branch's 
geographic markett
Average 24 month CD rate of other banks (rt
other) 
rt
other ×  Stress Proxy                           
Deposit concentration in a bank branch's geographic 
market (HHIt)
Seniort  ×  rt
other
Seniort  ×  rt
other ×  Stress Proxy
Table A4. Industry Equilibrium: The Interdependence between Banks' Deposit Rates
Share of failed deposits in a bank branch's geographic 
market (Fail-share)t
Branch-Level Analysis using the BRM data set (24 month CD)
Stress Proxy = Dummy from Bear Stearns failure to Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (March 14, 2008 - October 3, 2008)
Seniort  ×  Stress Proxy
HHIt  ×  Stress Proxy
HHIt  ×  rt
other
HHIt  ×  rt
other ×  Stress Proxy     
Seniors as share of population in a bank branch's 
geographic market (Seniort)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Large Time Core Large Time Large Time Core Core
Liquidity measures
0.131*** 0.258*** 0.132* 0.145** -0.092 -0.087
(0.044) (0.035) (0.070) (0.068) (0.064) (0.064)
0.047** -0.166*** -0.037 -0.040 -0.071 -0.067
(0.023) (0.023) (0.108) (0.109) (0.103) (0.103)
-0.206*** -0.244*** -0.026 -0.039 -0.198* -0.217*
(0.036) (0.027) (0.129) (0.128) (0.115) (0.114)
0.026 0.026 -0.057 -0.045 -0.095** -0.068
(0.030) (0.025) (0.049) (0.047) (0.046) (0.043)
-0.002 -0.039** 0.001 -0.052 -0.080 -0.131
(0.018) (0.017) (0.082) (0.077) (0.085) (0.082)
-0.030 0.004 0.032 0.018 -0.051 -0.020
(0.025) (0.016) (0.084) (0.085) (0.066) (0.062)
0.021 -0.138*** 0.141*** 0.140*** -0.093** -0.085**
(0.031) (0.027) (0.044) (0.044) (0.042) (0.042)
0.010 0.053*** 0.122* 0.070 0.159*** 0.125**
(0.018) (0.017) (0.065) (0.061) (0.059) (0.058)
-0.083*** 0.018 0.016 -0.045 0.147** 0.093
(0.022) (0.017) (0.083) (0.086) (0.072) (0.069)
Solvency measures
0.027 -0.189*** 0.469** 0.320* 0.281** 0.178
(0.078) (0.062) (0.205) (0.193) (0.122) (0.131)
-0.159 -0.008 -0.821 -0.690 0.427 0.498
(0.101) (0.055) (0.771) (0.780) (0.708) (0.706)
0.222*** 0.144*** -0.021 0.037 0.205 0.204
(0.078) (0.045) (0.205) (0.224) (0.155) (0.141)
-0.296* -0.241* -0.427* -0.577***
(0.160) (0.130) (0.242) (0.150)
0.194** -0.017 0.978*** 0.393**
(0.086) (0.098) (0.293) (0.185)
-0.105 -0.043 0.821** 0.262
(0.133) (0.088) (0.374) (0.229)
-0.195** -0.036 -0.035 -0.097 -0.006 -0.171
(0.083) (0.077) (0.169) (0.149) (0.122) (0.120)
-0.014 0.051 -0.372 -0.008 -0.361 0.115
(0.047) (0.065) (0.393) (0.359) (0.223) (0.255)
-0.011 0.102** -0.590* -0.250 -0.563* -0.039
(0.109) (0.052) (0.357) (0.337) (0.306) (0.278)
-0.204 -0.026 -0.037 -0.050 -0.019 -0.031
(0.137) (0.043) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
-0.054* -0.045** -0.034 -0.030 -0.049** -0.046**
(0.029) (0.018) (0.045) (0.044) (0.021) (0.022)
-0.032 0.007 -0.033 -0.035 -0.026 -0.032
(0.024) (0.021) (0.032) (0.031) (0.021) (0.022)














0.273 0.265 0.108 0.130
(0.174) (0.165) (0.149) (0.148)
0.672 0.396 1.363*** 1.061**
(0.450) (0.432) (0.377) (0.425)
0.548** 0.344 0.249 0.017













Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 48535 48628 20055 20055 20084 20084
R
2 0.73 0.81 0.77 0.77 0.88 0.88
The sample period of the regressions is from 2006 to 2009 in column (1) and (2), and from 1996 to 2009 in columns (3) to (6), using quarterly Call Report data. 
All specifications are panel regressions with fixed effects for bank organizations and quarterly time dummies. The reported  R
2 is the within R
2.  
All regressions control for District time trends and for the deposit-weighted geographic market deposit concentration (annual from Summary of Deposits).  
Crisis 1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 2007Q3 to 2008Q2, and Crisis 2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 2008Q3 to 2009Q2. 
The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are clustered at the bank organization level.
See Appendix for variable definitions and details about bank panel. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively.
(Reduced Sample of Banks with Available CRSP Equity Data) (Reduced Sample from 2006Q3 with 
Available Securitization Data)
Table A5. Additional Measures: Controlling for Real Estate Loans and Securitization Exposure and for Market Equity Information
Residential Mortgages Soldt-1  ×  Crisis1                 
Real Estate Loan Sharet-1
Real Estate Loan Sharet-1  ×  Crisis1                       
Real Estate Loan Sharet-1  ×  Crisis2                       
Residential Mortgages Soldt-1
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                                         
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Crisis2                             
NPL to Loanst-1
NPL to Loanst-1  ×  Crisis1                                      
NPL to Loanst-1  ×  Crisis2                                      
Capital ratiot-1
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                                       
Unused commitment ratiot-1
Unused commitment ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1
Unused commitment ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2       
Liquidity ratiot-1
Liquidity ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                                      
Liquidity ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                                      
Wholesale funding t-1
Wholesale funding t-1  ×  Crisis1
Wholesale funding t-1  ×  Crisis2       
Volatility of Daily Equity Returns t-1
Risk-based capital ratiot-1
Risk-based capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                        
Risk-based capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                        
Large Bank Indicator
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Crisis1                              
Residential Mortgages Soldt-1  ×  Crisis2                 
Quasi market capital to asset ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1       
Quasi market capital to asset ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2       
Volatility of Daily Equity Returns t-1  ×  Crisis1       
Volatility of Daily Equity Returns t-1  ×  Crisis2       
Equity Returnt-1
Equity Returnt-1  ×  Crisis1                                      
Equity Returnt-1  ×  Crisis2                                      
Quasi market capital to asset ratiot-1(1) (2) (3)
Large Time Rate Core Rate Share of Large 
Time Deposits 






























0 368*** 0 175 0 255***
Table A6. Additional Measures: Maturity Structure of Large-Time Deposits
Unused commitment ratiot-1
Unused commitment ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1
Unused commitment ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2       
Liquidity ratiot-1
Liquidity ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                                         
Liquidity ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                                         
Wholesale fundingt-1
Wholesale fundingt-1  ×  Crisis1
Wholesale fundingt-1  ×  Crisis2       
NPL to Loanst-1
NPL to Loanst-1  ×  Crisis1                                         
NPL to Loanst-1  ×  Crisis2                                         
Capital ratiot-1























Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 163450 163167 166117
R
2 0.78 0.89 0.21
The sample period of the regressions is from 1997 to 2009 (maturity information available from 1997), using quarterly Call Report data. 
All specifications are panel regressions with fixed effects for bank organizations and quarterly time dummies.
The reported R
2 is the within R
2.  All regressions control for District time trends and for the deposit-weighted geographic market 
deposit concentration (annual from Summary of Deposits).  Crisis 1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 2007Q3 to 2008Q2, 
and Crisis 2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 2008Q3 to 2009Q2. 
The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are clustered at the bank organization level.
See Appendix for variable definitions and details about bank panel. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively.
Share of large-time deposits maturing in 1 yeart-1
Share of large-time deposits maturing in 1 yeart-1  ×  Crisis1                   
Share of large-time deposits maturing in 1 yeart-1  ×  Crisis2                   
Risk-based capital ratiot-1
Risk-based capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                                       
Risk-based capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                                         
Large Bank Indicator
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Crisis1                                     
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Crisis2                                      
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                                         
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                                       (1) (2) (3)














































Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 175611 175638 176080
R
2 0.76 0.89 0.06
The sample period of the regressions is from 1996 to 2009, using quarterly Call Report data. 
All specifications are panel regressions with fixed effects for bank organizations and quarterly time dummies.
The reported R
2 is the within R
2.  All regressions control for District time trends and for the deposit-weighted geographic market 
deposit concentration (annual from Summary of Deposits).  Crisis 1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 2007Q3 to 2008Q2, 
and Crisis 2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 2008Q3 to 2009Q2. 
Note that the liquidity and solvency measures in this table are taken at their pre-crisis values.  That is, we include lagged values
of these measures up to 2007:Q2 and from then on, the value of these variables as of 2007:Q2 are used.
The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are clustered at the bank organization level.
See Appendix for variable definitions and details about bank panel. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively.
Risk-based capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                                         
Large Bank Indicator
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Crisis1                                     
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Crisis2                                      
NPL to Loanst-1  ×  Crisis2                                         
Capital ratiot-1
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                                       
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                                         
Risk-based capital ratiot-1
Risk-based capital ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                                       
NPL to Loanst-1  ×  Crisis1                                         
Table A7. Robustness Check: Pre-Crisis Values of Controls
Unused commitment ratio t-1
Unused commitment ratio t-1  ×  Crisis1
Unused commitment ratio t-1  ×  Crisis2       
Liquidity ratiot-1
Liquidity ratiot-1  ×  Crisis1                                         
Liquidity ratiot-1  ×  Crisis2                                         
Wholesale fundingt-1
Wholesale fundingt-1  ×  Crisis1
Wholesale fundingt-1  ×  Crisis2       
NPL to Loanst-1